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Doctors on the Take: Aligning Tort Law to 
Address Drug Company Payments to 
Prescribers 
LARS NOAH† 
I know you think you are being generous, but the foundation of gift 
giving is reciprocity. You haven’t given me a gift. You’ve given me 
an obligation. 
 
–“Dr.” Sheldon Cooper* 
INTRODUCTION 
From a very young age, we all learn to crave gifts. 
Whether to mark milestones (large and small) or holidays 
(major and minor), children become accustomed to getting 
stuff that they do not need. At first, some mystery may 
 
† Stephen C. O’Connell Chair, University Term Professor, and Professor of Law, 
University of Florida; author, Law, Medicine, and Medical Technology 
(Foundation Press 4th ed. 2017). 
* The Big Bang Theory: The Bath Item Gift Hypothesis (CBS television 
broadcast Dec. 15, 2008) (“The essence of the custom is that I now have to go 
out and purchase for you a gift of commensurate value and representing the 
same perceived level of friendship as that represented by the gift you’ve given 
me. It’s no wonder suicide rates skyrocket this time of year.”). One season later, 
the show’s eccentric physicist applauded the message of the classic Dr. Seuss 
book “How the Grinch Stole Christmas!” up until the eponymous character’s 
change of heart. See The Big Bang Theory: The Maternal Congruence (CBS 
television broadcast Dec. 14, 2009). 
856 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  66 
surround the gift givers, from Santa Claus, the Easter 
Bunny, the Tooth Fairy, a secret admirer on Valentine’s 
Day, or strangers dressed up in costumes handing out 
candy on Halloween, but with time most gift-givers want to 
get some credit for their generosity. 
Few of us ever outgrow the desire to receive gifts, 
though we try to become adept at giving them as well, while 
persons who prefer to opt out of the madness get rewarded 
with unkind epithets. Economists occasionally point out the 
inefficiency of the process,1 preferring the exchange of cold 
hard cash (or gift cards) or endorsing the increasingly 
popular “self-gifting” phenomenon,2 but our economy would 
suffer mightily if consumers heeded such advice. In certain 
contexts, however, the gift relationship has a less benign 
reputation, particularly when it involves elected officials or 
others charged with making decisions that should remain 
free of potential bias. 
Doctors like getting goodies as much as the rest of us. 
Indeed, some physicians bemoan the fact that patients have 
fallen out of the habit of expressing their gratitude in this 
fashion.3 Not to worry, the drug industry has stepped in to 
fill that void in a big way. In fact, some of the giveaways tie 
in nicely with the holidays, including complimentary 
 
 1. See JOEL WALDFOGEL, SCROOGENOMICS: WHY YOU SHOULDN’T BUY 
PRESENTS FOR THE HOLIDAYS (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Opinion, Why Holiday 
Gifts Get More “Ughs” Than “Oohs,” CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 2012, at A29; cf. John 
A. List & Jason S. Shogren, The Deadweight Loss of Christmas: Comment, 88 
AM. ECON. REV. 1350, 1354 (1998) (concluding that in-kind transfers do not 
necessarily destroy value); Editorial, You Shouldn’t Have. Really., CHI. TRIB., 
Dec. 20, 2015, at A28 (explaining other positive attributes associated with the 
practice). 
 2. See Michelle Boorstein, To Thine Own Self: Gift, Too, WASH. POST, Dec. 
18, 2012, at C1. 
 3. See Suzanne J. Koven, The Ungifted Physician, 279 JAMA 1607 (1998). 
Although I avoid health care professionals (and the exchange of gifts) like the 
plague, one time I gave a physician a signed copy of my casebook (MSRP > 
$200) in thanks for patiently attending to members of my immediate family. See 
Dedication from author to Catherine Blackband (Apr. 6, 2013) (copy on file with 
author). 
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Christmas trees and bouquets to pass along to that special 
someone on Valentine’s Day,4 though lately cash has taken 
center stage. The apparent generosity of companies that 
sell therapeutic products has encountered a growing chorus 
of criticism, however, because these gifts seek to influence 
physician choices that affect patient health. Although the 
recipients of industry largesse vehemently deny that their 
professional judgment could get corrupted so easily, they 
fool no one but themselves and may endanger their patients 
in the process.5 
Part I describes the nature and scope of industry 
payments to health care professionals. These have changed 
over time as a variety of institutions attempted to crack 
down on the practice. First, the medical profession issued 
ethical codes, and the industry adopted voluntary 
guidelines; next, federal agencies published nonbinding 
guidance documents and prosecuted some companies; most 
recently, a handful of states and then Congress imposed 
reporting requirements and created databases designed to 
promote transparency. Nonetheless, manufacturers of 
prescription drugs and medical devices continue to find 
ways of rewarding physicians for selecting their products, 
at times adopting creative tactics to evade the limited 
restrictions that currently exist, while researchers keep 
documenting the powerful impact of even trivial 
inducements. 
 
 4. See Chris Adams, Doctors on the Run Can “Dine ‘n’ Dash” in Style in 
New Orleans—Drug Companies Pick up Tabs and Make Sales Pitches; Free 
Christmas Trees, Too, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2001, at A1. 
 5. Although normally criticized for driving up costs, promotional campaigns 
at the time of initial product launch may expose patients to heightened risks 
because unexpected adverse events often turn up during the first few years 
after approval. See Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings 
and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215, 2218–19 (2002) 
(concluding that it may take several years of use to fully characterize a drug’s 
safety profile); Gordon D. Schiff et al., Principles of Conservative Prescribing, 
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1433, 1435 (2011) (suggesting that physicians 
wait to use a new drug until seven years have passed since its introduction). 
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Part II, therefore, suggests a couple of modifications in 
tort doctrine to tackle the problem. First, courts could 
expand the informed consent duties of physicians to include 
disclosures of potential conflicts of interest to patients, 
though in practice such a move might not accomplish much. 
Second, courts could recognize a novel exception to the 
“learned intermediary” doctrine, stripping manufacturers of 
an important limitation on their duty to warn when they 
have made certain types of payments to prescribers. If 
sellers of therapeutic products faced the prospect of having 
to supply adequate risk information directly to patients in 
such cases, then perhaps they might finally give up on this 
dubious method of marketing to health care professionals. 
I. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES PAYING  
PHYSICIANS TO PRESCRIBE THEIR PRODUCTS 
Manufacturers have found a variety of ways to 
encourage the selection of their prescription drug products. 
In response to evolving ethical codes, industry guidelines, 
and occasional prosecution of unlawful kickback schemes, 
the methods deployed by pharmaceutical companies have 
changed over time. For instance, firms have sponsored 
studies that appear to serve no other purpose than getting 
physicians into the habit of using a new drug for their 
patients. Recently adopted reporting requirements and the 
resulting databases have helped researchers more clearly 
document the full scope and continued impact of payments 
to prescribers. 
A. Evolving Industry Practices and Guidelines 
For at least half a century, manufacturers have 
lavished various types of gifts on health care professionals 
in the hopes of generating demand for their products. In an 
earlier era, the industry hardly tried to conceal its crass 
efforts to purchase the loyalty of physicians.6 The first 
 
 6. See, e.g., John C. Nelson, A Snorkel, a 5-Iron, and a Pen, 264 JAMA 742 
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ethical codes appeared in 1990, with both the medical 
profession and the pharmaceutical industry expressing 
their concerns about some of the gifts and prizes offered to 
prescribers.7 Although not entirely consistent with one 
another and periodically revised over the years,8 the 
guidelines now basically allow gifts of modest value (less 
than $100 or so) that serve some educational purpose or 
benefit patients.9 Nonetheless, because they lack any real 
force, these guidelines have managed to stamp out only the 
 
(1990); see also Lars Noah, Death of a Salesman: To What Extent Can the FDA 
Regulate Promotional Statements of Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives?, 47 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 309, 314 (1992) (explaining that in 1974 “Senator Edward 
Kennedy chaired hearings to examine the pharmaceutical industry . . . [and] 
characterized some of the promotional schemes as ‘payola’”); Susan Heilbronner 
Fisher, Note, The Economic Wisdom of Regulating Pharmaceutical “Freebies,” 
1991 DUKE L.J. 206, 211 (describing Wyeth-Ayerst’s program of giving frequent-
flyer miles on American Airlines for the selection of its antihypertensive 
Inderal® (propranolol): “Doctors who wrote fifty prescriptions would receive a 
free round-trip ticket to any destination in the continental United States.”). 
 7. See Noah, supra note 6, at 316; see also Am. Coll. Physicians, Physicians 
and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 112 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 624 (1990); Am. 
Med. Ass’n, Council on Ethical & Jud. Aff., Editorial, Gifts to Physicians from 
Industry, 265 JAMA 501 (1991). For the latest version issued by the American 
Medical Association (AMA), see Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.6.2, 
https://www.ama-assn.org/delivering-care/gifts-physicians-industry. 
 8. See, e.g., Susan L. Coyle, Physician-Industry Relations. Part 1: 
Individual Physicians, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 396, 397 (2002) (“Helpful 
questions for gauging whether a gift relationship is ethically appropriate 
include 1) What would my patients think about this arrangement?”); see also 
Lois Snyder, American College of Physicians Ethics Manual (6th ed.), 156 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 73, 88 (2012) (including an updated version of this 
policy); infra notes 19–20 and accompanying text (discussing revisions to the 
industry guidelines). 
 9. See Bill Brubaker, Drug Firms Still Lavish Pricey Gifts on Doctors; 
Ethics Debated As Freebies Flow, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2002, at E1 (“Nothing in 
the AMA guidelines discourages doctors from accepting as many free 
breakfasts, lunches or dinners as they want. . . . [F]ree meals must be ‘modest’ 
and have an educational component.”); cf. Douglas R. Waud, Pharmaceutical 
Promotions—A Free Lunch?, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 351, 352 (1992) (“[T]he idea 
seems to be to stick to bribes that are small enough to be swept under the rug if 
someone asks questions. . . . Can any physician really believe that patients 
would be happy to know that their doctors were taking bribes, no matter what 
the size?”). 
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most egregious abuses.10 
The industry bestows gifts on other parties as well. In 
addition to ingratiating themselves with physicians, some 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have enlisted retail 
pharmacists to help expand market share.11 Although less 
common, companies may offer financial enticements to 
patients.12 Sponsors of medical research have used similar 
inducements, paying physicians to refer their patients to 
clinical trials,13 and offering various goodies to subjects 
 
 10. See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard 
Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 431 
(2002) (“While the payola-style abuses of earlier decades have largely vanished, 
sales strategies have become more sophisticated, . . . and detail representatives 
continue to ‘wine and dine’ physicians.”); see also Kirsten E. Austad et al., 
Changing Interactions Between Physician Trainees and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: A National Survey, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1064, 1068 (2013) 
(finding failures to follow the latest industry code in giving gifts to medical 
students, which suggests that “voluntary, self-imposed guidelines may not be 
sufficient to end potentially problematic industry marketing practices”); David 
Grande, Limiting the Influence of Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts on Physicians: 
Self-Regulation or Government Intervention?, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 79, 80 
(2010) (“[E]vidence from state gift disclosure laws suggests that many 
physicians do not follow the AMA’s ethics guidelines.”). 
 11. See Gina Kolata, Pharmacists Help Drug Promotions: Some Doctors 
Dislike a Link with the Manufacturers, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1994, at A1 
(“[O]thers complain that when pharmacists make money on particular choices 
of drugs, they are no longer disinterested parties. It is no different, some say, 
from the doctor who owns the diagnostic laboratory down the street from his 
office and so benefits financially each time he sends a patient there for lab 
tests.”). 
 12. See Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing 
the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 169–70 (1997) (“[C]ritics 
suggest that some recent promotional campaigns, including coupons, rebates, 
and offers of free gifts in exchange for visits to physicians, are unseemly.”); see 
also Rhonda L. Rundle, A New Wrinkle in Rewards Programs—Restylane, Botox 
Offer Incentives for Loyal Patients; Some Raise Ethics Concerns, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 2, 2005, at D1 (describing incentives similar to frequent-flyer programs). 
 13. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between 
Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 361–62 (2002) 
(explaining that sponsors “may offer financial incentives to family physicians 
for recruiting subjects from among their existing patients”); Kurt Eichenwald & 
Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, 
§ 1, at 1 (“There are finder’s fees for those who refer their patients to other 
doctors conducting research.”); id. (“[T]op recruiters can earn as much as 
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upon enrollment.14 Conversely, health insurers sometimes 
provide financial incentives to prescribers in order to 
discourage the use of expensive brand-name drugs, which 
prompted one major pharmaceutical manufacturer to cry 
foul.15 
In the face of growing scrutiny of pricey gifts, lavish 
dinners, and junkets to vacation spots for physicians,16 the 
 
$500,000 to $1 million a year.”); see also Karine Morin et al., Managing 
Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 83 (2002) 
(The AMA concludes that “it is unethical for physicians to accept payment solely 
for referring patients to research studies.”); Roy G. Spece, Jr., Direct and 
Enhanced Disclosure of Researcher Financial Conflicts of Interest: The Role of 
Trust, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 409, 410 (2013) (calling such per capita payments for 
subject recruitment “a bribe of sorts”); id. at 420 & n.38 (noting that these 
bounties may reach $10,000 per enrolled subject). 
 14. See Lars Noah, Coerced Participation in Clinical Trials: Conscripting 
Human Research Subjects, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 329–30 & n.2, 358 & n.126 
(2010) (discussing inducements for participation in medical studies); Rachel 
Zimmerman, Desperately Seeking Kids for Clinical Trials, WALL ST. J., May 29, 
2002, at D1 (“To lure young patients, some trials are offering cash, gift 
certificates to Toys R Us and Tower records, T-shirts, and use of a Palm Pilot 
during the study.”); see also id. (“While it’s illegal to pay physicians cash 
‘bounties’ for recruiting children, some researchers are rewarded in other 
ways.”). 
 15. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Doctors Paid to Prescribe Generic Pills, WALL 
ST. J., Jan. 24, 2008, at B1 (reporting that one insurer offered physicians “$100 
each time they switch a patient from a brand-name drug,” adding that Pfizer 
complained about the program to several medical associations, and that the 
AMA cautioned that such payments might constitute illegal kickbacks); id. 
(Such approaches “are coming under fire for injecting financial incentives into 
what some patient advocates and legislators say should be a purely medical 
decision. Medical societies are also concerned that such rewards may put 
doctors in the ethically questionable position of taking a payment that patients 
know nothing about.”). Patients know nothing about such payments only 
because participating physicians remain silent. 
 16. See, e.g., Adriane Fugh-Berman & Shahram Ahari, Following the Script: 
How Drug Reps Make Friends and Influence Doctors, 4 PLOS MED. e150, at 
0623 (2007) (“High prescribers receive higher-end presents, for example, silk 
ties or golf bags.”); Robert M. Tenery, Jr., Interactions Between Physicians and 
the Health Care Technology Industry, 283 JAMA 391, 392 (2000); Adams, supra 
note 4, at A1 (“As the drug industry reaches new extremes in its courtship of 
prescribing doctors, the giveaways are flowing freely . . . [including] flowers, 
books, CDs, manicures, pedicures, car washes, bottles of wine and cash.”); id. 
(“mention[ing] ‘gas ‘n’ go’ events, where a doctor drives up, gets his tank filled 
and hears a drug pitch”); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, High-Tech Stealth 
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American Medical Association (AMA) launched a 
campaign—underwritten by drug companies no less—to 
remind physicians about the existing ethical guidelines.17 
In 2002, the pharmaceutical industry issued a code of 
conduct to address interactions with physicians,18 and its 
latest revision appeared one decade ago.19 The medical 
 
Being Used to Sway Doctor Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2000, at A1 
(noting the industry’s justification that “physicians are hungry for information 
about” new drugs coupled with a denial that they care much about “a free meal 
[at a fancy restaurant] or modest honorarium” of $250-$1,000). 
 17. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n, Guidelines on 
Gifts to Physicians from Industry: An Update, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 27, 28 
(2001) (“[T]he AMA is about to embark on a nationwide campaign to educate 
physicians about the importance of reducing and eliminating inappropriate gifts 
from industry.”); see also Susan Okie, AMA Criticized for Letting Drug Firms 
Pay for Ethics Campaign, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 2001, at A3 (“[D]rug companies 
often treated doctors to expensive gifts, lavish dinners, trips or cash payments. 
Publication of the guidelines helped curb such practices in the early 1990s, but 
more recently, studies and media reports have suggested that gift-giving to 
doctors by drug companies has increased . . . . [S]urveys indicate many doctors 
are unaware that the ethics guidelines exist.”); id. (“Drug companies’ gifts to 
doctors typically include such items as pens, notebooks, coffee cups, desk 
accessories and tote bags . . . [and] golf balls or golf club covers . . . . The AMA 
guidelines state that doctors should not accept gifts . . . if the gift is an incentive 
or a reward for prescribing a company’s drug.”). 
 18. See Scott Hensley, Sorry, Doc, No Dinners-to-Go—Drug Sales Reps Begin 
Building a New Marketing Playbook, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2002, at D4 (“The 
voluntary code, adopted . . . last week, would eliminate a pizza dropoff for the 
staff unless it is accompanied by an in-person educational session. 
Entertainment for its own sake would be eliminated entirely.”); id. (“No longer 
will [salespeople] be able to chat up a surgeon during intermission at a ‘Lion 
King’ performance, or bond side by side in half-court seats at a Lakers game.”); 
Jeffrey L. Seglin, Just Saying No to Gifts from Drug Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
18, 2002, § 3, at 4; Cyril T. Zaneski, Medical Sales Reps Arrive Bearing Gifts, 
BALT. SUN, June 17, 2004, at 1A (“The PhRMA code allows companies to provide 
meals and gifts of less than $100 in connection with presentations and sales 
visits. The gifts must be something that can be used in a medical office. A 
stapler with a drug logo is OK under the code. A box of golf balls or a ticket to a 
sporting event is not.”). 
 19. See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PhRMA), Code on Interactions 
with Healthcare Professionals 13 (July 2008), http://phrma-docs.phrma.org 
/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf (forbids offering or 
providing anything “in a manner or on conditions that would interfere with the 
independence of a healthcare professional’s prescribing practices”); Howard L. 
Dorfman, The 2009 Revision to the PhRMA Code on Interactions with 
Healthcare Professionals: Challenges and Opportunities for the Pharmaceutical 
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device industry adopted a similar code.20 Nonetheless, 
payments to health care professionals have continued under 
different guises.21 
For instance, some manufacturers have sponsored so-
called “seeding trials” that purport to elicit information 
about patient experiences from prescribers but in practice 
seemed to represent little more than financial inducements 
designed to encourage physicians to use a new drug or 
device.22 “Preceptorships” refer to an arrangement that 
 
Industry in the Age of Compliance, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 361, 364–70 (2009) 
(highlighting modifications to the industry guidelines that related to gifts and 
payments); see also infra note 52 (discussing the effort to end the giving of 
trinkets in this latest version of the code); cf. Elizabeth Wager, How to Dance 
with Porcupines: Rules and Guidelines on Doctors’ Relations with Drug 
Companies, 326 BMJ 1196, 1196–97 (2003) (comparing codes from around the 
world). 
 20. See Advanced Med. Tech. Ass’n (AdvaMed), Code of Ethics on 
Interactions with Health Care Professionals (July 2009), https://www.advamed. 
org/sites/default/files/resource/112_112_code_of_ethics_0.pdf; see also Bonnie 
O’Connor et al., Salespeople in the Surgical Suite: Relationships Between 
Surgeons and Medical Device Representatives, 11 PLOS ONE e0158510, at 16 
(2016) (“The issues and potential pitfalls of excessive industry influence in 
medical care and physicians’ treatment decision making are at least as urgent 
for implantable medical devices as they are for pharmaceuticals and prescribing 
practices, but to date they are far less well studied . . . .”). 
 21. See Christopher Lee, Drugmakers, Doctors Get Cozier: Gifts Continue, 
Contacts Increase Despite Guidelines, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2007, at A3 
(“Despite efforts to curb drug companies’ avid courting of doctors, the industry 
is working harder than ever to influence what medicines they prescribe, 
sending out sales representatives with greater frequency and plying physicians 
with gifts, meals and consulting fees . . . .”); id. (“The ties between doctors and 
drug companies are deepening despite voluntary guidelines to curb 
excesses . . . .”); see also David Blumenthal, Doctors and Drug Companies, 351 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1885, 1889 (2004) (“[A]s long as such relationships are legal, 
the parties involved will face constant temptations to test the limits of 
professional and industry codes and government regulations. One can predict, 
therefore, that there will be ongoing cycles of scandal and reform for the 
foreseeable future.”); Alexander C. Tsai, Policies to Regulate Gifts to Physicians 
from Industry, 290 JAMA 1776, 1776 (2003) (“Some observers perceived an 
abatement of marketing abuses, but it was short-lived. Within a few years, 
commercial detailers and physicians continued to exhibit behavior inconsistent 
with the guidelines.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, As Doctor Writes Prescription, Drug Company 
Writes a Check, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2004, § 1, at 1 (reporting that Schering-
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allows company representatives to shadow a physician 
while treating patients; although the industry defends this 
practice as a way of educating members of its sales force, 
while the AMA has focused on ensuring safeguards for 
patient autonomy and privacy,23 critics view preceptorships 
as nothing more than another concealed payoff to 
physicians.24 Speaking engagements and consulting 
agreements offer more typical mechanisms for funneling 
money to prescribers.25 If these payments reimburse 
 
Plough paid physicians “consulting fees” of $10,000 plus a bonus of up to $1,500 
per patient enrolled in a purported trial of Intron A, the company’s expensive 
hepatitis C drug); Barry Meier, Implant Program for Heart Device Was a Sales 
Spur, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at A1 (“[A]bout 80 cardiologists nationwide 
completed an evaluation run by the Guidant Corporation of one of its 
products . . . . In exchange for implanting the lead in three patients and 
completing five survey forms, each physician received $1,000 . . . .”); id. 
(“Several doctors who took part in the Guidant survey said that they did not tell 
their patients about the payments they received.”); Gregory Zuckerman, Biovail 
Tactics on Marketing Focus of Probe, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2003, at C1; see also 
infra Section I.D (discussing other seeding trials that have come to light). 
 23. See Bruce Japsen, AMA Says Drug Reps Not Welcome in Exams, CHI. 
TRIB., June 18, 2003, at A1 (describing a new policy that requires getting 
consent from patients). 
 24. See id. (“AMA members say patient shadowing is the latest attempt by 
pharmaceutical companies to influence physicians’ prescribing habits.”); Melody 
Petersen, Suit Says Company Promoted Drug in Exam Rooms, N.Y. TIMES, May 
15, 2002, at C1 (“Warner-Lambert’s shadowing program [for Neurontin®] 
involved an estimated 75 to 100 doctors . . . . Each doctor was paid $350 or more 
for each day they let sales representatives watch as they examined patients, 
according to court documents.”); Zaneski, supra note 18, at 1A (“Companies can 
pay several hundred dollars a day to physicians who allow reps into the 
examining room to learn first-hand about patients’ reactions with 
medications.”); AMA Turns Down Proposal to Ease Guideline on Gifts; Doctor 
Says Policy Ignored by Many, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2004, at C4 (reporting that 
the AMA had decided to defer action on a “proposal [that] would have urged 
doctors to refuse payment—sometimes hundreds of dollars daily—for 
shadowing, which critics say is meant to influence what drugs are prescribed”); 
see also L. Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives 
and the Doctor/Patient Relationship, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 594, 598–
99 (2002) (arguing that preceptorships are unethical). 
 25. See Hensley, supra note 18, at D4 (“[S]tretching the definition of 
consultant, sales reps now recruit local doctors, paying them hundreds of 
dollars for an evening meeting in town . . . . A doctor also can earn a consulting 
fee by helping a company study a drug or joining a company’s speakers bureau 
and lecturing colleagues.”); see also JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE TAKE: HOW 
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physicians for their time and expertise rather than loyalty, 
then they would represent legitimate compensation as 
opposed to dubious gifts.26 
B. Government Responses to Industry Abuses 
Although the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) has limited authority over verbal statements made 
by sales representatives,27 it enjoys essentially no power to 
regulate gifts.28 As a consequence, other actors have become 
more involved in trying to supervise the practice. For 
instance, a handful of states enacted laws regulating drug 
 
AMERICA’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR HEALTH 13 
(2005) (making a quip that prescribers hired in such a capacity may be “asked 
to consult on little more than which wine to order”); id. at 29 (offering some 
examples of consulting arrangements); Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for the Pizza? 
Redefining the Relationships Between Doctors and Drug Companies. 1: 
Entanglement, 326 BMJ 1189, 1191 (2003) (“[I]f a company flies 300 doctors to a 
golf resort, reimburses their costs, pays them to attend, and educates them 
about the company’s latest drug, in order to train them to become members of 
the company’s stable of paid speakers, the entire activity would be in 
compliance [with PhRMA’s original code].”); Liz Kowalczyk, Drug Firms and 
Doctors: The Offers Pour in, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 15, 2002, at A1 (“‘The companies 
used to call it coming to dinner,’ [Dr. Martin] Solomon said. ‘Now it’s called 
consulting.’”). 
 26. See Brubaker, supra note 9, at E1 (“The [AMA] guidelines offer some 
wiggle room. Doctors who have been deemed ‘advisers’ to drug companies, if 
only for a few hours, can accept honorariums and travel perks, for example. 
Forest Laboratories calls its advisers ‘advertising/marketing consultants’ in the 
confidentiality agreements they are asked to sign.”); id. (“The guidelines do not 
rule out five-star treatment—or honorariums—for doctors who provide 
‘genuine’—not ‘token’—services as company advisers.”). See generally Fred 
Eaton & Jaimee Reid, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall—Evaluating Fair Market 
Value for Manufacturer-Physician Consulting Arrangements, 65 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 141 (2010). 
 27. See Noah, supra note 6, at 317–26. 
 28. See Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Are Still Giving Gifts to Doctors, 
F.D.A. Officials Tell Senators, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A15 (reporting a 
statement by one high-level official that the agency “has no jurisdiction to police 
such efforts”); see also infra notes 63–65 and accompanying text (noting its 
limited power over seeding trials). Trinkets bearing brand names qualify as 
“reminder ads” that face few FDA restrictions. See 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(2)(i) 
(2017). 
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and device industry gifts to physicians.29 The Office of the 
Inspector General (OIG) for the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS), acting under its authority to 
investigate fraud and abuse involving the Medicare and 
Medicaid programs,30 issued a guidance document to 
address industry marketing practices.31 The OIG guidelines 
included an expression of particular concern about seeding 
trials.32 
 
 29. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 119402 (West 2017) (requiring 
the adoption of compliance programs that satisfy federal guidelines and 
PhRMA’s code); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. § 970.008(1) (2017) (barring essentially 
all gifts); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 151.461 (West 2017) (prohibiting companies from 
giving gifts worth more than $50 annually); NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2017) 
(requiring adherence to PhRMA’s code); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4632 (2017) 
(requiring annual reports); see also Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and Drug 
Companies—Scrutinizing Influential Relationships, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1796, 1796 (2007) (noting that Minnesota adopted a reporting requirement in 
1993, Vermont joined a decade later, followed by California, D.C., Maine, and 
West Virginia); Joseph S. Ross et al., Pharmaceutical Company Payments to 
Physicians: Early Experiences with Disclosure Laws in Vermont and Minnesota, 
297 JAMA 1216, 1220–22 (2007) (finding the reported data incomplete and 
inaccessible). 
 30. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2012); see also Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & 
Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies, or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the 
Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug 
and Medical Device Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 296–309 (1999). 
 31. See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,734–38 (May 5, 2003); Robert Pear, 
Drug Industry Is Told to Stop Gifts to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A1 
(“[T]he government said that drug makers could not offer incentive payments or 
other ‘tangible benefits’ to encourage or reward the prescribing or purchase of 
particular drugs by doctors . . . .”); id. (“While the new standards do not have 
the force of law, drug makers that flout them are more likely to be investigated 
and prosecuted for violations of federal fraud and kickback statutes.”); see also 
Susan Chimonas & David J. Rothman, New Federal Guidelines for Physician-
Pharmaceutical Industry Relations: The Politics of Policy Formation, 24 HEALTH 
AFF. 949 (2005) (discussing the OIG’s drafting process); David M. Studdert et 
al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Physicians’ Relationships with the 
Pharmaceutical Industry—Self-Regulation in the Shadow of Federal 
Prosecution, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1891, 1898–99 (2004) (discussing the OIG 
guidelines); id. at 1891 (“[G]overnment policing in this area is likely to 
intensify.”). 
 32. See OIG Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,735 (“Postmarketing research 
activities should be especially scrutinized to ensure that they are legitimate and 
not simply a pretext to generate prescriptions of a drug.”). Technically, however, 
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Several companies have faced prosecution for violating 
the anti-kickback law.33 For instance, Serono pled guilty 
after it had offered ten physicians a free trip to the French 
Riviera if they increased their use of an expensive AIDS 
drug.34 One year later, Schering-Plough agreed to a 
substantial fine for paying doctors $500 per patient started 
on the company’s hepatitis C treatment.35 More recently, 
corporate officers at Insys Therapeutics got charged with 
offering kickbacks to physicians for prescribing Subsys® 
(fentanyl sublingual spray) more widely than just for its 
 
the OIG guidelines lack the force of law. See id. at 23,731 (“The document is 
intended to present voluntary guidance to the industry and not to represent 
binding standards for pharmaceutical manufacturers.”); see also Lars Noah, 
Governance by the Backdoor: Administrative Law(lessness?) at the FDA, 93 NEB. 
L. REV. 89, 90–93, 113–22 (2014) (explaining that federal agencies increasingly 
issue guidance documents even though devoid of any binding effect). 
 33. See Gardiner Harris & Robert Pear, Drug Maker’s Efforts to Compete in 
Lucrative Insulin Market Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2006, at A14 
(“A number of drug companies are running afoul of the anti-kickback law.”); cf. 
Cindy A. Schipani et al., Doing Business in a Connected Society: The GSK 
Bribery Scandal in China, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (summarizing the 
prosecution of similar practices overseas). A few manufacturers agreed to report 
their physician payments to settle OIG investigations. See Sachin Santhakumar 
& Eli Y. Adashi, The Physician Payment Sunshine Act: Testing the Value of 
Transparency, 313 JAMA 23, 23 (2015) (“[B]y 2009, a total of 5 pharmaceutical 
companies had begun to disclose payment data in compliance with negotiated 
corporate integrity agreements.”). 
 34. See John Gibeaut, Seeking the Cure, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 44, 46 (“In 
exchange [for the trip], each doctor was to write 30 new prescriptions . . . .”); 
Eric Lichtblau, Settlement in Marketing of a Drug for AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
18, 2005, at C1 (reporting that Serono “admitted that it provided what 
amounted to illegal remuneration to a group of AIDS doctors by paying for them 
to attend a medical ‘conference’ in Cannes, France, in 1999 in exchange for the 
doctors’ writing more prescriptions for Serostim”); cf. Zaneski, supra note 18, at 
1A (“The U.S. Justice Department says Pfizer provided doctors with weekends 
at Florida and Hawaiian resorts and trips to the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta with 
little or no medical education provided on the junkets.”). 
 35. See Jeffrey Krasner, Drug Firm Hit with 3d Big Penalty in Five Years, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 30, 2006, at F1 (“The government cited an illegal kickback 
scheme Schering-Plough devised for its drugs used to treat hepatitis C. For each 
patient starting treatment with Schering-Plough’s drugs, doctors would receive 
up to $500.”). 
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approved use in treating breakthrough cancer pain,36 and 
those on the receiving end of these unlawful payments faced 
prosecution as well.37 Members of the medical device 
industry have gotten caught playing similar sorts of 
games.38 
 
 36. See David Armstrong, Drug Firm Accused of Bribing Doctors, BOS. 
GLOBE, Dec. 9, 2016, at C2; Joseph Walker, Fentanyl Billionaire Comes Under 
Fire, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2016, at A8; see also Evan Hughes, The Pain 
Hustlers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 6, 2018, at 55 (recounting the following 
explanation of the Insys speakers program by one former sales rep: “the real 
target was not the audience but the speaker himself, who would keep getting 
paid to do programs if and only if he showed loyalty to Subsys. It was a quid pro 
quo . . . .”); id. (“Some prescribers were paid four figures to ‘speak’ to an 
audience of zero.”); Katie Thomas, Drug Company Enlists Doctors Under 
Scrutiny: Big Payments for Top Painkiller Prescribers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 
2014, at A1 (Insys “reward[ed] high-prescribing physicians with perks like paid 
speaking engagements. And in at least two cases, the company hired the adult 
children of top doctors to serve as their parents’ sales representatives.”); id. 
(“During a five-month period at the end of 2013, Insys paid 20 doctors more 
than $30,000 each in speaking and consulting fees as well as perks like travel 
and meals.”). 
 37. See Benjamin Weiser & Katie Thomas, 5 New York Doctors Are Charged 
in a Fentanyl Kickback Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2018, at B2 (“Insys paid 
the doctors, in some cases more than $100,000 annually, in return for 
prescribing millions of dollars’ worth of the company’s painkiller product, the 
indictment said. It charged that Insys funneled the illicit payments to the 
doctors through a sham ‘speakers bureau’ . . . .”); id. (“Earlier this month, 
another top prescriber, Jerrold Rosenberg of Rhode Island, was sentenced to 
more than four years in prison after admitting he took kickbacks from Insys.”). 
Most of the time, physicians accused of receiving kickbacks from manufacturers 
suffer absolutely no consequences. See Tracy Weber & Charles Ornstein, This 
Won’t Hurt a Bit, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2011, at G1 (“At least 15 drug and 
medical-device companies have paid $6.5 billion since 2008 to settle accusations 
of marketing fraud or kickbacks. However, none of the more than 75 doctors 
named as participants were sanctioned . . . .”). 
 38. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 
236–37 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing summary judgment granted to the defendant 
in a False Claims Act lawsuit where a whistleblower surgeon charged a 
manufacturer of orthopedic implants with offering kickbacks to a hospital chain 
for purchasing products later billed to Medicare); see also Jason M. Hockenberry 
et al., Financial Payments by Orthopedic Device Makers to Orthopedic Surgeons, 
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1759, 1762–63 (2011); Reed Abelson, Possible 
Conflicts for Doctors Are Seen on Medical Devices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at 
A1 (“[F]ederal prosecutors have begun to investigate some device makers’ deals 
with doctors, trying to determine if they amount to payoffs for using a 
product.”); Barry Meier, An Rx for Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B1 
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A little-noticed provision in the Affordable Care Act 
created a federal requirement that health care providers 
report the receipt of anything worth at least $10 (or several 
smaller gifts annually if they exceed $100 in the aggregate), 
though it excluded the value of free product samples.39 The 
resulting compilation of data has revealed substantial 
industry funds flowing to physicians.40 Nonetheless, the 
prospect of disclosure apparently made companies 
somewhat less likely to offer—and physicians less likely to 
accept—covered gifts.41 
 
(reporting that some manufacturers entered into corporate integrity 
agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice, which include obligations to 
disclose payments); Medtronic Agrees to $23.5 Million Settlement in Kickback 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at B7 (discussing cardiac device seeding trials). 
 39. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6002, 124 Stat. 119, 689–96 (2010) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h (2012)). See generally Richard S. Saver, Deciphering the 
Sunshine Act: Transparency Regulation and Financial Conflicts in Health Care, 
43 AM. J.L. & MED. 303 (2017). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) promulgated regulations to implement this provision. See Medicare, 
Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Transparency Reports and 
Reporting of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 78 Fed. Reg. 9458 
(Feb. 8, 2013) (codified as amended at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403(I) (2017)). The database 
appears at www.cms.gov/openpayments. 
 40. See Peter Loftus & Joseph Walker, Doctors, Hospitals Got $6.49 Billion 
from Firms in ’14, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2015, at B3; see also Deborah C. Marshall 
et al., Disclosure of Industry Payments to Physicians: An Epidemiologic Analysis 
of Early Data from the Open Payments Program, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 84, 92–
93 (2016) (comparing payments across different specialties); Genevieve Pham-
Kanter et al., Public Awareness of and Contact with Physicians Who Receive 
Industry Payments: A National Survey, 32 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 767, 771 
(2017) (finding a wider impact when measured as the percentage of patients 
seen by physicians who receive payments); Which Drug Companies Give Gifts to 
Your Doc?, DENV. POST, July 14, 2014, at 2C (reporting that an earlier survey 
found “nearly 95 percent of U.S. physicians accept gifts, meals, payments, travel 
and other services from companies that make the drugs and medical products 
they prescribe”); id. (“Although patients will benefit from increased 
transparency in coming years, the ultimate goal of policymakers is to pressure 
doctors to give up some of their more egregious relationships with industry.”). 
 41. See Peter Loftus, The New State of Health Care: Doctors Face New 
Scrutiny over Gifts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 2013, at A1 (“Many doctors say the 
increased disclosures are making them rethink their relationships with 
industry . . . . Some fear patients will view the payments as tainting their 
medical decisions . . . .”); Jonathan D. Rockoff & Hester Plumridge, Drug Firms 
Curb Ties to Doctors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2013, at B3; see also Ed Silverman, A 
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These laws and guidelines do not obligate recipients of 
industry gifts and payments to disclose their arguable 
conflicts of interest to patients,42 and it seems that 
relatively few patients take the initiative to search the 
federal database.43 In contrast, physicians must reveal to 
patients self-referrals,44 and, in the pharmaceutical context, 
they should secure prior consent for preceptorships.45 At the 
 
Hefty Payday for Hospitals; Drug, Device Makers Paid Billions in 2015 to Care 
Providers, BOS. GLOBE, July 1, 2016, at C1 (“[C]ompanies increased charitable 
contributions on behalf of physicians by more than 120 percent. Payments for 
food and beverage, travel and lodging, and consulting fees were either flat or 
declined very slightly. Payments for honoraria fell by about 50 percent and by 
more than 30 percent for gifts . . . .”); cf. Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: 
Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” About Consumer 
Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 398 (1994) (“[W]arning requirements 
occasionally represent a surreptitious form of regulation, for instance, to 
encourage design modifications or product reformulations without directly 
mandating the desired changes.”). But see Tong Guo et al., The Effect of 
Information Disclosure on Industry Payments to Physicians (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3064769 (finding that the 
federal disclosure law has had only a limited impact on payments); Genevieve 
Pham-Kanter et al., Letter, Effect of Physician Payment Disclosure Laws on 
Prescribing, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 819, 820 (2012) (same for state 
disclosure laws). 
 42. See Abigail Zuger, How Tightly Do Ties Between Doctor and Drug 
Company Bind?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2004, at F5 (“[C]alls for transparency 
have yet to penetrate to the individual doctor’s office, still a black box where 
conflicts of interest go virtually unchallenged.”); cf. Lars Noah, When 
Constitutional Tailoring Demands the Impossible: Unrealistic Scrutiny of 
Agencies?, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1462, 1468 n.21 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court 
invalidated a state law requiring that charitable solicitors disclose what 
percentage of donations actually reach the charity because the state instead 
could have published the financial disclosure forms that it already collected. . . . 
Such alternative options hardly seem, however, to work nearly as well.”). 
 43. See Lisa Schencker & Jennifer Smith Richards, Ill. Physicians Got $74M 
from Drug Firms in 2016; Database Difference Still Being Debated, CHI. TRIB., 
Aug. 20, 2017, at C1; see also Abigail Zuger, What Do Patients Think About 
Physicians’ Conflicts of Interest? Watching Transparency Evolve, 317 JAMA 
1747, 1748 (2017) (doubting that much would change even if they did). 
 44. See Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 575 (1993) (“A physician is required, for example, to 
tell patients about his or her financial interest in the laboratory to which they 
are being referred and to let them decide whether to go to a different 
laboratory.”). 
 45. See Zaneski, supra note 18, at 1A (“AMA guidelines and federal privacy 
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other extreme, far more serious conflicts of interest largely 
remain hidden from view.46 Somewhat remarkably, even 
though extensive federal rules govern informed consent in 
the research setting,47 nothing demands that investigators 
alert subjects to potential conflicts in that context.48 Then 
again, some commentators have speculated that disclosure 
grants a clear conscience to recipients of industry payments 
who might otherwise harbor ethical qualms about the 
 
rules require that doctors allow the practice, known as ‘shadowing,’ only if 
patients give their ‘informed consent.’”); see also supra notes 23–24. 
 46. See Ian Larkin & George Loewenstein, Business Model-Related Conflict 
of Interests in Medicine: Problems and Potential Solutions, 317 JAMA 1745, 
1745–46 (2017); Jean M. Mitchell & Jonathan H. Sunshine, Consequences of 
Physicians’ Ownership of Health Care Facilities—Joint Ventures in Radiation 
Therapy, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1497, 1500 (1992); William W. Stead, Editorial, 
The Complex and Multifaceted Aspects of Conflicts of Interest, 317 JAMA 1765 
(2017) (summarizing contributions to a theme issue devoted to this broader 
subject). See generally INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL 
RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 
2009); Symposium, Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Medicine, 40 J.L. MED. 
& ETHICS 431 (2012). 
 47. See Noah, supra note 13, at 382–86; see also Federal Policy for the 
Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149 (Jan. 19, 2017) (codified in 
scattered titles of the C.F.R.) (overhauling the rules implemented by multiple 
agencies). 
 48. See Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Gregory A. Guagnano, Investigator Financial 
Disclosures and Its Effect on Research Subjects, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 727, 729 
(2007) (“FDA’s disclosure regulations, however, do not require that subjects in a 
clinical study be told about the potential conflicts of interest.”); Deborah L. 
Shelton & Jason Grotto, Patients at Heart of Device Debate; Many Unaware of 
Potential Doctor Conflicts of Interest, CHI. TRIB., May 23, 2011, at A1 (reporting 
that hundreds of patients undergoing heart valve repair unknowingly received 
investigational annuloplasty rings invented by their cardiac surgeon); see also 
Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects: 
Guidance for Human Subject Protection, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,393, 26,397 (May 12, 
2004) (suggesting disclosure); Lindsay A. Hampson et al., Patients’ Views on 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Cancer Research Trials, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2330, 2336 (2006) (finding limited interest among subjects); id. at 2331 
(explaining that the AMA and others recommend full disclosure of potential 
financial conflicts by investigators); Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Views of Potential 
Research Participants on Financial Conflicts of Interest: Barriers and 
Opportunities for Effective Disclosure, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 901, 904 (2006) 
(“[W]e found that many participants want to know about financial interests in 
research, whether or not they report that such knowledge would affect their 
decision to participate.”). 
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practice,49 and centralized reporting—as opposed to 
informing patients directly—may only magnify this 
problem. 
C. Documenting the Impact of Gifts to Prescribers 
If health care professionals simply pocketed such 
payments without altering their prescribing choices, then 
gift giving by the pharmaceutical industry would provide no 
cause for alarm. Although companies might wonder why 
they persist in wasting this money, and patients ultimately 
get to pick up the tab, therapeutic decision making by these 
physicians would remain entirely uncorrupted. In reality, 
however, gifts to prescribers unmistakably influence 
treatment choices,50 and even fairly trivial gifts can have an 
 
 49. See Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of 
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 7, 22 (2005); id. at 3 
(“Physicians will prefer disclosing gifts from pharmaceutical companies (or 
disclosing payments for referring patients to clinical trials) to actually 
eschewing such benefits.”); George Loewenstein et al., The Unintended 
Consequences of Conflict of Interest Disclosure, 307 JAMA 669, 670 (2012) 
(“[P]erhaps the most significant likely pitfall of disclosure is . . . a kind of moral 
licensing on the part of the profession as a whole—the rationalization that, with 
disclosure, the profession has dispensed with its obligation to deal with conflicts 
of interest.”); see also Elisabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, 
at Jan. 22, 2012, at SR1 (“[D]isclosure has taken on the gestalt of confession: 
Dump the information and be absolved of further moral or legal 
responsibility.”). 
 50. See Noah, supra note 10, at 432 (“Although most doctors express 
probably unjustified confidence that such sales pitches and freebies do not 
influence their own prescribing behavior, they do worry about their more 
gullible colleagues.”); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, ATLANTIC, Apr. 2006, at 82 
(“The trick is to give doctors gifts without making them feel that they are being 
bought. ‘Bribes that aren’t considered bribes,’ [former drug rep turned academic 
Michael] Oldani says.”); Shelley Murphy, Gifts to Doctors Is Effective Marketing, 
Some Drug Firm Employees Say, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 17, 2002, at B1; Zaneski, 
supra note 18, at 1A (“Few doctors would admit that drug company sales 
pitches influence their prescribing. But pharmaceutical companies behave as 
though the reps and their handouts matter very much indeed.”); Abigail Zuger, 
When Your Doctor Goes to the Beach, You May Get Burned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 
2004, at F5 (noting that this “is one of the few research topics in medicine that 
will not attract drug company financing”). 
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impact.51 After revisions to the industry code sought to end 
the practice of distributing trinkets emblazoned with drug 
brand names and company logos,52 free food has become the 
most common coin of this realm.53 
Numerous studies have found a link between industry 
payments and prescribing behavior.54 Although previously 
 
 51. See Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on 
Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 254 (2003); id. at 252 
(“[S]mall gifts may be surprisingly influential.”); David Grande et al., Effect of 
Exposure to Small Pharmaceutical Promotional Items on Treatment Preferences, 
169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 887, 892 (2009); Dana Katz et al., All Gifts Large 
and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Gift-Giving, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 2003, at 39, 41 (“When a gift or gesture 
of any size is bestowed, it imposes on the recipient a sense of indebtedness. The 
obligation to directly reciprocate, whether or not the recipient is conscious of it, 
tends to influence behavior.”); Bernard Lo & Deborah Grady, Payments to 
Physicians: Does the Amount of Money Make a Difference?, 317 JAMA 1719, 
1720 (2017). 
 52. See Natasha Singer, No Lipitor Mug? Drug Makers Cut out Goodies for 
Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008, at A1 (“The sudden scarcity of free goodies, 
though, could enhance the cachet of collections that some doctors have 
assembled over the years . . . .”); see also Michael J. Oldani, Thick Prescriptions: 
Toward an Interpretation of Pharmaceutical Sales Practices, 18 MED. 
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 325, 336 (2004) (recalling from his time as a drug rep that 
doctors sometimes would specifically request distinctive pens and mugs); Chris 
Adams, Student Doctors Protest Largess of Drug Makers, WALL ST. J., June 24, 
2002, at B1 (discussing the “Viagra calculator that stood up on a base when the 
‘on’ button was pressed”). 
 53. See Robert Steinbrook, Physicians, Industry Payments for Food and 
Beverages, and Drug Prescribing, 317 JAMA 1753, 1753 (2017) (“Although the 
median value of each food and beverage payment is modest, these are by far the 
most frequent types of gifts and payments that physicians receive from 
industry, apparently now supplanting the branded black bags, pens, mugs, and 
other tchotchkes of yore.”); see also L. Lewis Wall & Douglas Brown, The High 
Cost of Free Lunch, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 169, 171 (2007) (singling 
out the persuasive power of food); Ravi Parikh, If Your Doctor Accepts a Free 
Meal, Are You Paying for It?, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2016, at E6; Stephanie 
Saul, Drug Makers Pay for Lunch as They Pitch, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at 
A1. 
 54. See, e.g., Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical Industry: 
Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 JAMA 373, 375–79 (2000) (reviewing the 
literature available at the time); see also Anusua Datta & Dhaval Dave, Effects 
of Physician-Directed Pharmaceutical Promotion on Prescription Behaviors: 
Longitudinal Evidence, 26 HEALTH ECON. 450, 452–53, 465–66 (2017) 
(referencing and building upon the research published in the economics and 
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researchers had to conduct surveys of physicians,55 the 
federal payments database now offers a goldmine for 
anyone interested in this question.56 Several recently 
published studies have documented an association between 
drug industry payments and prescribing behavior,57 
including the remarkable discovery that even inexpensive 
meals might do the trick.58 Investigative journalists also 
 
marketing literature on all types of advertising directed to doctors); infra notes 
57–59 (citing some of the latest studies). 
 55. See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell et al., A National Survey of Physician-
Industry Relationships, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1742, 1746 (2007) (“Overall, 94% 
of the [survey] respondents reported some kind of relationship with industry 
during the previous year.”); Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician Professionalism 
and Changes in Physician-Industry Relationships from 2004 to 2009, 170 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1820, 1823–25 (2010) (finding a drop of ten percentage 
points in a follow up survey). More recently, researchers have tapped into 
individual state or company-specific payment databases. See, e.g., Aaron S. 
Kesselheim et al., Distributions of Industry Payments to Massachusetts 
Physicians, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2049, 2051 (2013); James S. Yeh et al., 
Association of Industry Payments to Physicians with the Prescribing of Brand-
Name Statins in Massachusetts, 176 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 763, 765–67 (2016); 
see also Alison R. Hwong et al., A Systematic Review of State and Manufacturer 
Physician Payment Disclosure Websites: Implications for Implementation of the 
Sunshine Act, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 208 (2014) (comparing these databases). 
 56. See, e.g., Scott E. Hadland et al., Industry Payments to Physicians for 
Opioid Products, 2013–2015, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1493, 1493 (2017) (“For 
the first time, exhaustive data on payments are now available through the 
Open Payments program . . . .”); id. at 1494 (finding that one out of twelve 
physicians received payments from sellers of opioids during the study period, 
totaling over $46 million); Kathryn R. Tringale et al., Types and Distribution of 
Payments from Industry to Physicians in 2015, 317 JAMA 1774, 1780 (2017) 
(“The current population-based analysis of industry-to-physician payments in 
2015 shows the far-reaching extent (more than 10 million transactions totaling 
$2.4 billion) of these reported financial relationships.”). 
 57. See, e.g., William Fleischman et al., Association Between Payments from 
Manufacturers of Pharmaceuticals to Physicians and Regional Prescribing: 
Cross Sectional Ecological Study, 354 BMJ i4189, at 6–7 (2016); Aaron P. 
Mitchell et al., Letter, Pharmaceutical Industry Payments and Oncologists’ 
Selection of Targeted Cancer Therapies in Medicare Beneficiaries, 178 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 854 (2018); Roy H. Perlis & Clifford S. Perlis, Physician 
Payments from Industry Are Associated with Greater Medicare Part D 
Prescribing Costs, 11 PLOS ONE e0155474, at 10 (2016); Susan F. Wood et al., 
Influence of Pharmaceutical Marketing on Medicare Prescriptions in the District 
of Columbia, 12 PLOS ONE e0186060, at 9–11 (2017). 
 58. See Colette DeJong et al., Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Meals 
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have uncovered similar linkages in the federal database.59 
D. The Seedy Aspects of “Seeding Trials” 
Seeding trials have drawn particular criticism. Once 
largely just a matter of speculation, researchers have 
documented their growing use.60 In 1994, FDA officials 
summarized the attributes of these “studies” as follows: 
Features that distinguish such trials from scientifically rigorous 
studies include the use of a design that does not support the stated 
research goals, the recruitment of investigators not because they 
are experts or leading researchers but because they are frequent 
 
and Physician Prescribing Patterns for Medicare Beneficiaries, 176 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1114, 1120 (2016) (finding “that receipt of a single industry-
sponsored meal, with a mean value of less than $20, was associated with 
prescription of the promoted brand-name drug at significantly higher rates,” 
and that “the relationship was dose dependent, with additional meals and 
costlier meals associated with greater increases in prescribing of the promoted 
drug”); id. at 1121 (noting caveats); see also Peter Loftus, Study Says Gifts 
Affect Physicians’ Drug Choices, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2016, at A1 (reporting on 
this study). 
 59. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, Public Disclosure of Payments to Physicians 
from Industry, 317 JAMA 1749, 1749–50 (2017) (discussing the work of 
ProPublica); Aaron Kessler et al., The More Opioids Doctors Prescribe, the More 
Money They Make, CNN (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/11/ 
health/prescription-opioid-payments-eprise/index.html; see also Dennis 
Thompson, Drug Firms’ Gifts Linked to Docs’ Choices, BALT. SUN, June 22, 
2017, at C1 (reporting that payments of a few hundred dollars influenced 
selections among equally effective cancer treatments even though patients 
might face more bothersome side effects as a result of the choice). 
 60. See David Malakoff, Allegations of Waste: The “Seeding” Study, 322 
SCIENCE 213, 213 (2008) (“Although seeding trials may be a longtime open 
secret in the industry, the authors [of a new article in the Annals of Internal 
Medicine] write that the Merck documents [involving Vioxx®] ‘provide the first 
strong documentary evidence’ of the practice.”); Bob Fernandez, Journal Takes 
on Drugmaker “Seeding Trials,” PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2008, at C1 (“Seeding 
trials had been an ‘open secret’ in the drug industry, but there had been no hard 
proof to show they existed.”); see also id. (Dr. Harold Sox “said seeding trials 
betrayed the trust patients had in doctors and drug companies. Patients say 
they believe they are participating in a bona fide drug trial to determine health 
benefits of a drug. But drug companies have other goals: selling 
pharmaceuticals.”). At least temporarily, seeding trials may manage to dodge 
federal reporting requirements: CMS allows delayed disclosure (for up to four 
years) of payments related to non-clinical trials designed to investigate 
potential new uses of approved products. See 42 C.F.R. § 403.910 (2017). 
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prescribers of competing products in the same therapeutic class, 
disproportionately high payments given to “investigators” for their 
work (although the only work may be to write prescriptions for the 
drug), sponsorship of the studies by the company’s sales and 
marketing division rather than its research department, minimal 
requirements for data, and the collection of data that are of little 
or no value to the company.61 
Their article offered a pair of examples that the agency had 
encountered, including one seeding trial for a new 
antihypertensive agent that tasked the manufacturer’s 
sales force with recruiting 2,500 frequent prescribers of 
such drugs who would agree to enroll a dozen patients each, 
which earned participating physicians $85 per patient (up 
to $1,050 total).62 The FDA could do little, however, other 
than deliver a slap on the wrist, “inform[ing] the sponsor 
that no data from this trial could be used to promote the 
product,”63 even though the authors had recognized that the 
trial itself rather than any collected results represented the 
central aspect of this promotional campaign.64 
Over the last decade, more such illustrations have 
 
 61. David A. Kessler et al., Therapeutic-Class Wars—Drug Promotion in a 
Competitive Marketplace, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1350, 1351 (1994). 
 62. See id.; see also id. (quoting an internal company memo about another 
antihypertensive seeding trial that also sought 2,500 physicians though to 
enroll only ten patients each). 
 63. Id. In contrast, the agency managed to prevent a planned seeding trial of 
an anticonvulsant—which intended to recruit 500 prescribers to enroll five 
patients each (and earn $100 per patient)—because it had represented “a thinly 
disguised” effort to promote the drug for an unapproved use (i.e., panic disorder) 
and, for that reason, would have violated federal law. See id. 
 64. See id. (calling these studies “thinly veiled attempts to entice doctors to 
prescribe a new drug,” aimed at “undoing physicians’ comfortable habits of 
prescribing a competing, more established product”); see also Bruce M. Psaty & 
Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Clinical Trial Investigators and Their Prescribing 
Patterns: Another Dimension to the Relationship Between Physician 
Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 295 JAMA 2787, 2788 (2006) 
(discussing a slightly more rigorous trial of an approved asthma drug that 
remained unpublished but “had the desired outcome of seeding studies and 
improved market share among trial-conducting practices”); id. at 2787 (“The 
umbrella of a research study allows the sponsor to pay the physician 
investigators in a way that circumvents rules against direct inducements to 
prescribe.”). 
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emerged after again escaping regulatory oversight.65 First, 
documents uncovered in litigation against Pfizer revealed 
that a predecessor company had conducted a seeding trial 
for the anticonvulsant Neurontin® (gabapentin), recruiting 
more than 700 physicians to enroll an average of three 
patients each (and receive $300 per patient) in order to try 
higher-than-approved doses of the drug in treating 
epilepsy.66 A couple of years later, researchers discussed a 
similar campaign that Merck undertook to encourage the 
use of Vioxx® (rofecoxib),67 which the company later 
withdrew from the market after discovering that this 
prescription analgesic posed heightened cardiovascular 
risks.68 Apart from objections to promotion masquerading 
 
 65. See Carl Elliott, Op-Ed., Useless Studies, Real Harm, N.Y. TIMES, July 
29, 2011, at A27 (complaining that, “even after particularly egregious seeding 
trials have been exposed, the F.D.A. has not issued sanctions,” adding that 
subjects may suffer serious injuries but institutional review boards “don’t 
typically pass judgment on whether a study is being carried out merely to 
market a drug”). 
 66. See Michael Steinman et al., Narrative Review: The Promotion of 
Gabapentin: An Analysis of Internal Industry Documents, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 284, 289–90 (2006) (discussing this seeding trial as just one among many 
of the seller’s questionable marketing tactics); see also Samuel D. Krumholz et 
al., Study of Neurontin: Titrate to Effect, Profile of Safety (STEPS) Trial: A 
Narrative Account of a Gabapentin Seeding Trial, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
1100, 1104–05 (2011) (offering more details about this seeding trial); id. at 1103 
(“[C]ompany sales representatives rewarded some investigators for achieving 
specific recruitment milestones; physicians were given a free lunch after 
recruiting 3 patients and a free dinner after 7 patients.”); id. at 1105 (arguing 
provocatively that the participating physicians represented the true and 
unwitting subjects of this company-sponsored research). 
 67. See Kevin P. Hill et al., The ADVANTAGE Seeding Trial: A Review of 
Internal Documents, 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 251, 252, 256 (2008) 
(explaining that the company recruited 600 physicians to serve as investigators, 
enrolling over 5,500 of their patients, half of whom received Vioxx); see also 
Philip Greenland & Donald Lloyd-Jones, Critical Lessons from the ENHANCE 
Trial, 299 JAMA 953, 954 (2008) (speculating that a study of Vytorin® 
(ezetimibe with simvastatin), another Merck drug, was nothing more than a 
seeding trial). 
 68. See Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took Long Path 
to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 1. 
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as scientific investigation,69 seeding trials unmistakably 
influence the prescribing choices made by participating 
physicians.70 
II. REFASHIONING TORT DOCTRINE TO COMBAT 
INAPPROPRIATE DRUG MARKETING TACTICS 
What, if anything, might guard against the problems 
associated with pharmaceutical industry payments to 
prescribers? Some commentators have called on health care 
professionals to stop accepting such gifts altogether.71 
Given the apparent failure of self-regulation, however, 
 
 69. See C. Seth Landefeld & Michael A. Steinman, The Neurontin Legacy—
Marketing Through Misinformation and Manipulation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
103, 105 (2009); Joseph S. Ross et al., Promoting Transparency in 
Pharmaceutical Industry-Sponsored Research, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 72, 72–
73 (2012); Harold C. Sox & Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Seeding Trials: Just 
Say “No,” 149 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 279, 279 (2008) (“Why would a drug 
company go to the expense and bother of conducting a trial involving hundreds 
of practitioners—each recruiting a few patients—when a study based at a few 
large medical centers could accomplish the same scientific purposes much more 
efficiently?”). 
 70. See Morten Andersen et al., How Conducting a Clinical Trial Affects 
Physicians’ Guideline Adherence and Drug Preferences, 295 JAMA 2759, 2764 
(2006) (concluding that “physician involvement in clinical trials is a powerful 
tool for influencing company-specific drug preferences”). 
 71. See Blumenthal, supra note 21, at 1889 (“The only practical approach to 
dealing with interactions between drug companies and physicians, in the view 
of many critics, is for physicians not to accept anything of financial value, no 
matter how trivial, from drug companies.”); Howard Brody, The Company We 
Keep: Why Physicians Should Refuse to See Pharmaceutical Representatives, 3 
ANNALS FAM. MED. 82, 84–85 (2005); Philip Greenland, Editorial, Time for the 
Medical Profession to Act: New Policies Needed Now on Interactions Between 
Pharmaceutical Companies and Physicians, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 829, 
830 (2009); Thomas L. Hafemeister & Sarah P. Bryan, Beware Those Bearing 
Gifts: Physicians’ Fiduciary Duty to Avoid Pharmaceutical Marketing, 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 491, 518, 528–29, 536–37 (2009); Katz et al., supra note 51, at 43–
44; Lewis H. Margolis, The Ethics of Accepting Gifts from Pharmaceutical 
Companies, 88 PEDIATRICS 1233, 1235–37 (1991); Ray Moynihan, Who Pays for 
the Pizza? Redefining the Relationships Between Doctors and Drug Companies. 
2. Disentanglement, 326 BMJ 1193, 1193 (2003); Mary Engel, A Pox on Drug 
Maker Freebies, Say Some Doctors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, at A1. See 
generally Symposium, Dangerous Liaisons? Industry Relations with Health 
Professionals, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398 (2009). 
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other commentators have called for greater legislative and 
regulatory intervention.72 This Part suggests, instead, that 
the judiciary might have a productive role to play. 
Relatively minor adjustments to medical malpractice and 
products liability rules could make physician payments less 
attractive to both recipients and companies. 
A. Informed Consent Duties of Health Care Professionals 
Physicians may face civil liability if they fail to secure 
the informed consent of their patients.73 In a few 
jurisdictions that continue to focus on the origins of the 
doctrine in the tort of battery, consent obligations attach 
only in cases of surgical and other invasive procedures, 
thereby excluding therapeutic interventions such as 
pharmaceutical products recommended by a physician.74 
For the most part, however, physicians also must secure 
informed consent when they recommend noninvasive 
treatments,75 particularly when they prescribe or 
 
 72. See Rikin S. Mehta, Why Self-Regulation Does Not Work: Resolving 
Prescription Corruption Caused by Excessive Gift-Giving by Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 799, 820–21 (2008); id. at 808–10 
(critiquing the internal compliance programs adopted by two large 
pharmaceutical manufacturers); Joshua Weiss, Note, Medical Marketing in the 
United States: A Prescription for Reform, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 260, 273–76, 
292 (2010); see also Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug 
Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 184, 185 (2007) (“[P]hysicians have so many ways of justifying 
their relationships with detailers that conflict-of-interest policies based on self-
regulation are unlikely to succeed.”); id. at 189 (“Given physicians’ attitudes, 
even these minimal [voluntary] standards are not likely to succeed . . . .”). 
 73. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724–25 (1997) (referencing 
this longstanding common-law rule). For a more detailed treatment of this tort 
obligation, see Noah, supra note 13, at 364–79. 
 74. See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 619–20 (Pa. 1997); see also 
Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 732–33 (Tenn. 1998) (treating the failure to 
secure informed consent as a claim for battery); cf. Shuler v. Garrett, 743 F.3d 
170, 173–75 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that the administration of heparin against 
the patient’s wishes and in spite of her known allergy to the drug qualified as a 
medical battery under Tennessee law). 
 75. See Matthies v. Mastromonaco, 733 A.2d 456, 460–61 (N.J. 1999) 
(holding that a physician who prescribed bed rest as treatment for a fractured 
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administer pharmaceutical products.76 Financial conflicts of 
interest generally have not, however, required disclosure. 
1. Types of Information That Doctors Must Disclose 
Before subjecting a patient to a diagnostic or 
therapeutic intervention, health professionals must 
describe its general nature.77 More importantly, they need 
to reveal any significant risks known to accompany the 
medical procedure.78 In addition, physicians must disclose 
reasonable alternative courses of action to the patient.79 
Some courts would include among such alternatives the 
likelihood of a better outcome if treated by a more skillful 
physician (in effect, a duty of referral),80 but other 
 
hip had a duty to advise his elderly patient of surgical alternatives); Allen v. 
Harrison, 374 P.3d 812, 817–18 (Okla. 2016). 
 76. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560, 562–63 (9th Cir. 
1990); Summit Bank v. Panos, 570 N.E.2d 960, 967–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see 
also Schilling v. Ellis Hosp., 906 N.Y.S.2d 187, 188–89 (App. Div. 2010) (holding 
that a psychiatrist may have breached a duty to warn the patient of a rare risk 
of developing gynecomastia from use of the antipsychotic Risperdal® 
(risperidone)). 
 77. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1019 (Md. 1977); Kohoutek v. 
Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 298–300 (Minn. 1986); Baird v. Am. Med. Optics, 713 
A.2d 1019, 1027–28 (N.J. 1998). 
 78. See, e.g., Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198, 206–08 (Ky. 2015); Rizzo v. 
Schiller, 445 S.E.2d 153, 155 (Va. 1994); see also Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., 687 
N.E.2d 1300, 1302–04 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that a pediatrician owed the parents 
a duty to warn of the risk of contracting polio from their vaccinated infant); cf. 
Dewey K. Ziegler et al., How Much Information About Adverse Effects of 
Medication Do Patients Want from Physicians?, 161 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
706, 711–12 (2001) (finding that patients report wanting unrealistic amounts of 
information about drug risks). 
 79. See, e.g., Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28, 31 (Iowa 1991); Herrington v. 
Spell, 692 So. 2d 93, 100 (Miss. 1997); Jandre v. Wis. Injured Patients & 
Families Comp. Fund, 813 N.W.2d 627, 666 (Wis. 2012). The duty to disclose 
alternatives does not, however, include telling patients about the availability of 
experimental treatments. See, e.g., Moore v. Baker, 989 F.2d 1129, 1133 (11th 
Cir. 1993); Schiff v. Prados, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 171, 182–84 (Ct. App. 2001). 
 80. See, e.g., Barriocanal v. Gibbs, 697 A.2d 1169, 1173 (Del. 1997); Goldberg 
v. Boone, 912 A.2d 698, 717 (Md. 2006); Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 
N.W.2d 495, 504–10 (Wis. 1996); see also Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville 
Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 687–88 (Ky. 2003) (“If the patient’s 
ailment is beyond the physician’s knowledge, ability or capacity to treat with 
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characteristics related to the provider rather than the 
underlying course of treatment generally would not 
necessitate disclosure.81 
The duty to secure informed consent only requires that 
physicians communicate “material” information to their 
patients.82 Traditionally, courts asked what a reasonable 
physician would have disclosed under the circumstances,83 
but many states have replaced this professional standard 
with a patient-based test of informed consent,84 asking 
whether a reasonable person would have regarded the 
information as important.85 Whatever the standard used for 
 
reasonable success, the physician has a duty to disclose the situation to the 
patient and to advise the patient to consult a specialist.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 20–22 (Conn. 2006) (poor prior 
outcomes); Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777, 780–82 
(Ga. 2000) (substance abuse); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958–59 (Haw. 
1997) (lack of special credentials); Jarrell v. Kaul, 123 A.3d 1022, 1034–35 (N.J. 
2015) (lack of mandated liability insurance coverage); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 
A.2d 1255, 1258–59 (Pa. 2001) (surgeon’s relative inexperience); see also 
Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (“[E]ven 
medical school grades[] could be considered material facts . . . . [W]e conclude 
that a surgeon’s lack of experience in performing a particular surgical procedure 
is not a material fact for purposes of finding liability predicated on failure to 
secure an informed consent.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 299–302 (1st Cir. 
2002); Dunn v. Yager, 58 So. 3d 1171, 1200–02 (Miss. 2011). 
 83. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254–56 & n.7 (10th Cir. 
2010); Paul v. Lee, 568 N.W.2d 510, 514–16 (Mich. 1997); Robinson v. Bleicher, 
559 N.W.2d 473, 478 (Neb. 1997). 
 84. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[I]t 
is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the 
direction in which his interests seem to lie.”); Shannon v. Fusco, 89 A.3d 1156, 
1170 (Md. 2014); see also David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in 
Informed Consent Law: Two Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risk, 4 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 105, 119–21 (2007) (evaluating the split of 
authority on this question). 
 85. See Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 905 (Cal. 1980) (“Material 
information is that which the physician knows or should know would be 
regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when 
deciding to accept or reject the recommended medical procedure.”); Carr v. 
Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 494–99 (Haw. 1995); Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. 
Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 361–62 (Iowa 1987). A few other courts opt for a more 
subjective test, which inquires about the perhaps idiosyncratic prior knowledge 
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judging materiality, plaintiffs also must prove causation, 
which typically means asking whether a reasonable patient 
would have declined a treatment had the physician 
disclosed the additional information.86 
2. Obligating Physicians to Reveal Conflicts of Interest 
Perhaps the informed consent doctrine should include a 
duty to reveal potential conflicts of interest. Although 
arguably immaterial as a provider characteristic,87 financial 
conflicts that bear directly on the choice of treatment 
certainly should qualify as relevant information.88 Many 
physicians seem to have an ethical blind spot on this score: 
 
and preferences of the particular patient. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 
F.2d 1544, 1548–49 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 1145, 1150–51 
(Alaska 1993); Lugenbuhl v. Dowling, 676 So. 2d 602, 605–06 (La. Ct. App. 
1996); Macy v. Blatchford, 8 P.3d 204, 209–11 (Or. 2000). 
 86. See, e.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 671–76 (Haw. 1995); Ashe v. 
Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122–24 (Tenn. 1999); Backlund v. 
Univ. of Wash., 975 P.2d 950, 957–59 (Wash. 1999); see also Martin v. Lahti, 
809 S.E.2d 644, 650 (Va. 2018) (upholding the dismissal of a deceased patient’s 
informed consent claim for lack of proof on causation after concluding that her 
daughters’ “testimony is nothing but speculation about what Starr’s thought 
process might have been if various items of information had been provided to 
her with respect to this specific surgery”). 
 87. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In fact, a handful of courts 
have declined to require disclosures of potential conflicts of interest. See, e.g., 
Dimmick v. United States, No. C 05-0971 PJH, 2006 WL 3741911, at *19–20 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) (rejecting the claim that a physician should have 
disclosed his work as a consultant for the manufacturer of the HIV drug 
Kaletra® (ritonavir)); Corrigan v. Methodist Hosp., 874 F. Supp. 657, 659 (E.D. 
Pa. 1995) (surgeon with financial ties to manufacturer of bone screws). 
 88. See Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose 
Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 1019–24 
(2007); Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the 
Boundaries of Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 841–43. Half a century ago, 
in the course of rejecting challenges to a state law that barred physician 
ownership of pharmacies, a California court explained that “the doctor who has 
a financial interest in where his prescriptions are filled may be tempted to 
prescribe unnecessary medicine, or to prescribe a drug which yields a greater 
margin of profit or to keep a patient on drugs for an unnecessary period of 
time.” Magan Med. Clinic v. Cal. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 57 Cal. Rptr. 256, 
262 (Ct. App. 1967) (adding that “a sick patient deserves to be free of any 
reasonable suspicion that his doctor’s judgment is influenced by a profit 
motive”). 
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insofar as they refuse to recognize the possibility that gifts 
and payments might influence their treatment decisions,89 
these doctors see no need for disclosure. Several studies 
have, however, demonstrated that goodies and money affect 
prescribing choices,90 and patients evidently want to know 
about it.91 In a similar vein, when health care professionals 
make use of experimental treatments or otherwise engage 
in research using their patients, concerns about the 
potential for conflicts of interest help to explain demands 
for fuller disclosure about this aspect of the encounter.92 
 
 89. See Allan S. Brett et al., Are Gifts from Pharmaceutical Companies 
Ethically Problematic? A Survey of Physicians, 163 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
2213, 2216–18 (2003); Howard Brody, A Matter of Influence, 21 HEALTH AFF. 
232, 232 (2002) (bemoaning “how blind we are to the fact that we are being 
influenced”); Campbell, supra note 29, at 1796 (“[P]hysicians vehemently deny 
that their industry relationships have any of these negative effects—but they 
are less convinced that the same is true of their physician colleagues.”); Michael 
A. Steinman et al., Of Principles and Pens: Attitudes and Practices of Medicine 
Housestaff Toward Pharmaceutical Industry Promotions, 110 AM. J. MED. 551, 
555–56 (2001); see also Michael Booth & Jennifer Brown, Doctors Still Received 
Big Fees from Drug Companies to Speak, DENV. POST, Mar. 26, 2013, at 1A 
(“Some of the doctors said they disclose these payments to patients, but many 
doctors declined to answer questions about their fees.”). 
 90. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text. 
 91. See Michael A. Steinman, Gifts to Physicians in the Consumer Marketing 
Era, 284 JAMA 2243, 2243 (2000) (“Surveys show that as many as 70% of 
patients believe these gifts significantly impact prescribing, and . . . 24% of 
patients reported that their perception of the medical profession changed after 
learning about drug company gifts to physicians.”); see also Robert V. Gibbons 
et al., A Comparison of Physicians’ and Patients’ Attitudes Toward 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts, 13 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 151, 153 (1998) 
(“Patients are more likely than their physicians to believe that acceptance of 
pharmaceutical gifts may influence prescribing behavior.”); David Grande et al., 
Pharmaceutical Industry Gifts to Physicians: Patient Beliefs and Trust in 
Physicians and the Health Care System, 27 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 274, 277 
(2012) (“[P]atients that believe physicians accept pharmaceutical industry gifts 
are significantly more likely to report . . . distrust.”); Marian Wolston, An MS 
Patient Loses Trust When She Finds out Her Doctor Is Paid by Drug Companies, 
30 HEALTH AFF. 2449, 2451 (2011) (“I find it inexcusable that doctors aren’t 
routinely required to disclose their conflicts of interest to their patients.”). 
 92. See, e.g., Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 255 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) 
(“The psychology of the doctor-patient relation, and the rewards, financial and 
professional, attendant upon recognition of experimental success, increase the 
potential for abuse and strengthen the rationale for uniform disclosure.”); see 
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Even if seeding trials do not represent genuine research, 
they undoubtedly create financial pressures that may 
influence treatment choices.93 
In the move from its origins in the law of battery, the 
duty of doctors to secure informed consent extends well 
beyond the standards of professional negligence and 
resembles an obligation owed by fiduciaries.94 Indeed, 
several commentators have defined the physician-patient 
relationship in precisely such terms.95 Although this 
therapeutic relationship does not countenance broader 
expectations of safeguarding the nonmedical interests of 
patients,96 physicians as fiduciaries should scrupulously 
 
also Noah, supra note 13, at 371 (“[S]everal arguments support the imposition 
of more rigorous informed consent requirements in the research context . . . 
[including] heightened concerns about conflicts of interest, which means that 
the researcher may have goals other than doing what is best for the subject.”); 
id. at 379 (speculating that a requirement to disclose experimental status 
“alerts patients to the need for exercising greater vigilance about the potential 
for conflicts of interest”); id. at 393 (“[P]hysicians may face some of the same 
conflicts of interest that researchers encounter.”). 
 93. See supra notes 22, 60–70 and accompanying text. 
 94. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483, 486 (Cal. 1990) 
(distinguishing the fiduciary obligations of the plaintiff’s physicians from the 
more limited duties of several other named defendants); Gomez v. Sauerwein, 
289 P.3d 755, 759 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d, 331 P.3d 19 (Wash. 2014); see 
also Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916 
(1994) (“Physicians may not deal with their patients at arm’s length; they owe 
their patients a fiduciary duty, which includes an obligation to act exclusively in 
the patient’s interests and to disclose all information material to those 
interests.”); id. at 921 (“[T]he physician must go so far as to prefer the patient’s 
interests to her own, acting as the patient’s selfless, scrupulous, dutiful agent.”); 
id. at 927–28 (discussing the conflicts of interest rationale for demanding 
informed consent). 
 95. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A 
Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167, 1186–210 (2009); Dayna Bowen Matthew, 
Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 
BUFF. L. REV. 715, 721–22, 726–59, 795–98 (2011); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Why 
Physicians Are Fiduciaries for Their Patients, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 45–57 
(2015). 
 96. See Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 608–09 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the 
duty to disclose did not extend to information material to a patient’s financial or 
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avoid—or at least reveal the existence of—financial 
interests that might taint their treatment 
recommendations.97 In a handful of cases, courts have 
construed the duty to secure patient consent as 
encompassing such disclosures.98 If recognized more 
broadly, then patients might enjoy greater protection from 
questionable prescribing choices. 
Even if courts embraced the idea that industry 
payments provided a basis for asserting informed consent 
 
other nonmedical interests); Moore, 793 P.2d at 485 n.10 (“In some respects the 
term ‘fiduciary’ is too broad. . . . A physician is not the patient’s financial 
adviser.”); see also E. Haavi Morreim, The Clinical Investigator as Fiduciary: 
Discarding a Misguided Idea, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 586, 588 (2005) (noting 
that “it is debatable whether physicians are fiduciaries in the strictest sense”); 
id. at 588–90 (elaborating); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis 
as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 301–03 (1999); id. at 307 
(“[P]hysicians should not feel pressured into becoming zealous advocates for 
their patients outside of the therapeutic relationship.”). 
 97. See Hafemeister & Bryan, supra note 71, at 519–32 (advocating the 
recognition of claims for a breach of fiduciary duty whenever physicians accept 
industry payments that might taint their therapeutic recommendations). 
 98. See, e.g., Shapira v. Christiana Care Health Servs., Inc., 99 A.3d 217, 
220–22 (Del. 2014) (rejecting an objection to the relevancy of evidence that a 
catheter manufacturer had paid the defendant physician to join its speaker’s 
bureau because the jury could treat this potential conflict of interest as material 
in resolving the patient’s informed consent claim); id. at 222 (“The conflict 
created a risk that [Dr.] Shapira wanted to perform the procedure because it 
would benefit him personally, and not because it was the most appropriate 
procedure. Likewise, the conflict created a risk that Shapira did not disclose or 
consider all reasonable alternatives.”); id. (“This is not a case where a doctor 
fails to disclose that she owns some stock in a publicly-traded medical company. 
Shapira was making a name for himself, and earning money, by promoting the 
On-Q procedure. In addition, he was gathering data about the procedure’s 
efficacy.”); D.A.B. v. Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 171–72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(recognizing that a prescriber who received kickbacks from the distributor of 
Protropin® (human growth hormone) could face liability for malpractice (failure 
to secure informed consent) but not for breach of fiduciary duty, and dismissing 
the claim on other grounds); see also Moore, 793 P.2d at 483–86 (holding that a 
leukemia patient could assert informed consent and breach of fiduciary duty 
claims against his physician for failing to disclose a research interest in cells 
removed during and after a splenectomy); id. at 484 (“The possibility that an 
interest extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s 
judgment is something that a reasonable patient would want to know in 
deciding whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment.”). 
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claims, it would probably do little to guard against 
physician conflicts of interest. Financial conflicts have 
become endemic in medical research,99 but disclosure 
requirements have not worked terribly well.100 Unless 
health care professionals find themselves embarrassed to 
confess about the industry gifts that they receive and 
respond to a disclosure obligation by avoiding the conflict in 
the first place, simply sharing this information with 
patients will not accomplish much. Upon hearing such 
disclosures, some patients might become wary about their 
physician’s treatment recommendation (perhaps 
unnecessarily so) or at least first decide to get a second 
opinion,101 but in most cases the revelation of a potential 
conflict of interest will likely go the way of so much other 
information made an aspect of consent obligations—
namely, in one ear and out the other.102 
 
 99. See Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of 
Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 463–64 
(2003); Noah, supra note 10, at 406–12, 415, 422–24, 434; see also id. at 395 
(“[P]hysicians must remain vigilant about the conflicts of interest that now 
permeate the biomedical literature.”); William M. Sage, Some Principles 
Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive 
Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007). 
 100. See Noah, supra note 10, at 409 (“Even if authors conscientiously 
adhered to the disclosure requirements, this mechanism for dealing with 
conflicts of interest may have only limited value.”); Shirley S. Wang, Simply 
Disclosing Funds Behind Studies May Not Erase Bias, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 
2006, at A11; see also Lisa A. Bero, Editorial, Accepting Commercial 
Sponsorship: Disclosure Helps—but Is Not a Panacea, 319 BMJ 653, 654 (1999) 
(“Disclosure does not necessarily eliminate the influence of industry funding on 
research or doctors’ behaviour.”). 
 101. See Adam Licurse et al., The Impact of Disclosing Financial Ties in 
Research and Clinical Care: A Systematic Review, 170 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
675, 680–81 (2010) (concluding that disclosure would have fairly modest effects 
on patient decision making); cf. Joshua E. Perry et al., Trust and Transparency: 
Patient Perceptions of Physicians’ Financial Relationships with Pharmaceutical 
Companies, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 475, 484, 487 (2014) (finding in a survey that 
industry payments led respondents to view a hypothetical physician as less 
trustworthy, except for consulting fees, which instead resulted in a perception of 
greater expertise). 
 102. See Katrina Armstrong & Andrew A. Freiberg, Challenges and 
Opportunities in Disclosing Financial Interests to Patients, 317 JAMA 1743, 
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B. Disclosure Duties of Prescription Drug Manufacturers 
Whether or not physicians might face liability for 
failing to inform their patients of potential conflicts of 
interest, the companies that intrude upon that relationship 
should shoulder responsibility. Indeed, given the inherent 
shortcomings associated with litigating informed consent 
claims, courts might do well to focus on the sources rather 
than the recipients of gifts. It would not make sense, 
however, to obligate manufacturers of prescription products 
to disclose physician payments, as these companies rarely 
owe any duty to communicate directly with patients. 
Instead, courts could expand the limited tort duties of 
manufacturers to warn in a way better calibrated to the 
consequences of their efforts to inappropriately influence 
prescribers: in those cases where they have offered rewards 
to a particular physician in exchange for selecting their 
therapeutic products, those companies should lose the 
benefit of the learned intermediary doctrine, which would 
then obligate them to supply adequate warnings of 
prescription drug risks directly to the patients of these 
conflicted doctors. 
1. Obligations to Warn Learned Intermediaries 
Traditionally, manufacturers satisfied their duty to 
warn of the hazards associated with prescription drugs or 
implanted medical devices by communicating risk 
information to physicians, under the so-called “learned 
intermediary” rule. Insofar as it imposes a duty to warn 
health care professionals, the doctrine hardly provokes any 
 
1744 (2017) (“The amount of information could easily become overwhelming, 
making it more likely that it will be ignored in decision making.”); see also Omri 
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 667–70 (2011); Christine Grady, Enduring and Emerging 
Challenges of Informed Consent, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 855, 857 (2015) 
(Patient’s “decisions are driven more by trust in their doctor or by deference to 
authority than by the information provided.”). Actually, consent to medical 
treatment has become primarily about signing lengthy forms without managing 
to read or understand them. 
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controversy.103 The affiliated absence of a duty to warn 
patients, however, continues to raise eyebrows.104 Courts 
have justified this rule on a number of grounds: physicians 
must make the judgment about whether to administer or 
prescribe a medication or use a device; manufacturers 
should not intrude on the doctor-patient relationship (for 
instance, by providing information that contradicts the 
physicians’ advice to the patient or unnecessarily alarms 
the patient, possibly leading to noncompliance with the 
prescribed therapy); physicians can better tailor their 
communication of important and complex information in 
ways understandable to their typically less-educated 
patients; and manufacturers have no practical means of 
conveying risk information directly to patients, apart from 
drugs that pharmacists dispense in unit-of-use packaging 
with enclosed leaflets for patients.105 
 
 103. See Lars Noah, This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 839, 892 (2009) (“[E]ven critics of the rule do not suggest that 
pharmaceutical companies should provide warnings only to patients and have 
no tort duty to warn physicians.”); id. at 892 n.226 (“Indeed, the first judicial 
opinion to use the ‘learned intermediary’ terminology did so in a case where the 
prescription drug manufacturer had argued that it owed no duty to warn the 
physician.”). Courts also have found duties to warn physicians, nurses, and 
other health care professionals who may treat or advise patients in the 
aftermath of someone else’s earlier prescribing or treatment decision. See, e.g., 
Bee v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 18 F. Supp. 3d 268, 295–96 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(dentists); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 92–93 (Tex. App. 
2000) (nurses). 
 104. See Noah, supra note 103, at 894 (“The learned intermediary doctrine 
has attracted its share of critics who argue, among other things, that the 
defense reflects an anachronistic and excessively paternalistic model of the 
physician-patient relationship and fails to take into account changes in the 
delivery of health care services.”); see also Stevens v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 
247 P.3d 244, 259 (Mont. 2010) (“The realities of modern medicine increasingly 
conflict with the learned intermediary doctrine’s underlying premises. 
Unsurprisingly, the doctrine is in a state of flux as it adapts to new medical 
practices.”). 
 105. Noah, supra note 12, at 170; see also id. at 155–61 (elaborating on these 
rationales with copious citations to the case law and commentary available 
more than twenty years ago); id. at 180 (“In the past, the learned intermediary 
rule protected manufacturers of prescription drugs from tort liability if they 
conveyed an adequate warning to physicians. Some commentators have argued 
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Mass immunizations represented the classic exception 
to the learned intermediary doctrine: when vaccines are 
administered in such a program, no health care professional 
makes any sort of an individualized medical decision or 
engages in a dialogue with their patient.106 A few courts 
have extended this exception to other products, such as 
prescription contraceptives, for which a physician may play 
a reduced role in helping patients to select among available 
options.107 The overwhelming majority of courts do not, 
however, recognize any exception for contraceptive drugs or 
devices.108 Courts occasionally have crafted still other (ad 
hoc) exceptions where the rationales underlying the learned 
 
that the rule no longer serves a legitimate purpose and should be eliminated 
altogether or at least reduced in scope by recognizing a number of new 
exceptions.”); Noah, supra note 103, at 890–97 (revisiting these rationales with 
updated citations and further analysis); id. at 912 (noting the application to 
certain medical devices). The last (practical) concern has become far less 
significant as pharmacists increasingly print out and attach patient information 
sheets at the time of dispensing, though these generally do not originate with 
drug manufacturers. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Prescription Leaflets Lack Key 
Safety Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at D3; see also Richard C. Ausness, The 
Disorderly Conduct of Words: Civil Liability for Injuries Caused by the 
Dissemination of False or Inaccurate Information, 65 S.C. L. REV. 131, 180–82 
(2013) (discussing claims brought against the publishers of “patient drug 
education materials” supplied by pharmacists when filling prescriptions). 
 106. See, e.g., Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 F.2d 349, 356 (2d Cir. 1987) (“If 
the drug is given under clinic-type conditions the manufacturer is obligated to 
warn consumers directly.”); Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 647 
(4th Cir. 1981) (limiting the mass-immunization exception to massive, 
nationwide immunization programs where it would have been foreseeable by 
the manufacturer that the “vaccine would be dispensed without a physician’s 
consideration of individual needs and circumstances”); Allison v. Merck & Co., 
878 P.2d 948, 958 n.16 (Nev. 1994). 
 107. See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(intrauterine devices (IUDs)); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 
878–79 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (oral contraceptives); Niedner v. Ortho-McNeil 
Pharm., Inc., 58 N.E.3d 1080, 1084–85 (Mass. Ct. App. 2016) (hormonal 
contraceptive patch). 
 108. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 
704–05 & n.18 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (collecting cases), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 
1999); see also Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 272 (D. Me. 
2004) (declining to extend the rationales underlying the contraceptive exception 
to an antidepressant prescribed for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder). 
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intermediary doctrine no longer apply.109 
When it appeared two decades ago, the Products 
Liability Restatement grudgingly endorsed the learned 
intermediary doctrine in its special rules governing sellers 
of prescription drugs and medical devices.110 An 
accompanying comment explained that the blackletter 
formulation attempted to capture the mass immunization 
exception, discussed the debate about possible exceptions 
where the FDA has required the use of patient package 
inserts (PPIs) or manufacturers have decided to engage in 
direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA), but left to 
developing case law the adoption of these or still other 
exceptions.111 
 
 109. See, e.g., Nichols v. McNeilab, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 562, 564–65 (E.D. Mich. 
1993) (holding that the learned intermediary doctrine would not defeat a claim 
alleging failure to provide notification of a drug recall prompted by safety 
concerns, distinguishing this from the risk information conveyed to patients at 
the time that a drug is initially prescribed); Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 
P.3d 944, 953 (Ariz. 2016) (holding the rule inapplicable to a misrepresentation 
claim). But cf. Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 846–47 (Conn. 2001) 
(declining to do so for drug samples). 
 110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). Learned intermediary concepts undergirded adjacent blackletter 
provisions related to design defects and the liability of non-manufacturing 
sellers. See id. cmt. d (“When prescribing health-care providers are adequately 
informed of the relevant benefits and risks associated with various prescription 
drugs and medical devices, they can reach appropriate decisions regarding 
which drug or device is best for specific patients.”); id. cmt. f (“Learned 
intermediaries must generally be relied upon to see that the right drugs . . . 
reach the right patients.”); id. cmt. h (explaining that retailers “should be 
permitted to rely on the special expertise of . . . prescribing and treating health-
care providers”). Two years after publication of this volume, however, one 
state’s high court rejected the new design defect standard while endorsing the 
learned intermediary rule on failure-to-warn claims. See Freeman v. Hoffman-
La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839–42 (Neb. 2000). 
 111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. e. Just prior to 
publication of this volume, one court declined to apply the doctrine whenever a 
drug manufacturer supplied PPIs. See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 
301 (Okla. 1997). Nonetheless, this exception remains a distinctly minority 
position. See, e.g., Yates v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm., Inc., 808 F.3d 281, 
292–93 (6th Cir. 2015); Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ill. 
1996). 
2018] DOCTORS ON THE TAKE 891 
Just as this volume of the Restatement of Torts made its 
debut, I elaborated on the curious twists and turns that had 
occurred during the drafting process in relation to the 
learned intermediary doctrine,112 before explaining at 
length some of the serious flaws in proposals to recognize a 
DTCA exception.113 Indeed, insofar as it effectively would 
impose a penalty for engaging in commercial speech 
whether or not it has any potential to mislead listeners, 
state action crafting such an exception arguably violates the 
First Amendment.114 Apart from a decision of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court in 1999,115 several courts confronted 
with efforts to adopt a DTCA exception have appropriately 
declined to do so.116 One decade ago, however, the high 
court of West Virginia took its concerns about such 
advertising a step further and rejected the learned 
intermediary doctrine altogether.117 Nonetheless, apart 
 
 112. See Noah, supra note 12, at 161–68. 
 113. See id. at 168–79; see also id. at 173 (“Proponents of an advertising 
exception cannot rebut the two central rationales underlying the learned 
intermediary doctrine: patients cannot lawfully purchase a prescription drug 
without receiving authorization from a physician, and physicians are far better 
situated than manufacturers to communicate with patients.”); id. at 175 
(“[P]harmaceutical manufacturers would have to find a way of disseminating 
[PPIs], ensure that these inserts contained references to all possible side effects 
in nontechnical language, and, in the unlikely event that they managed to 
design such an unassailable warning, hope that a jury would not decide that 
continued advertising to consumers diluted the effectiveness of that warning.”); 
id. at 180 (concluding that “no persuasive case exists for recognizing an 
advertising exception”). 
 114. Cf. Lars Noah, Truth or Consequences?: Commercial Free Speech vs. 
Public Health Promotion (at the FDA), 21 HEALTH MATRIX 31, 54–57 & nn.110–
12 (2011) (pointing out the U.S. Supreme Court’s surprising use of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in a drug advertising case); id. at 85–89 
(explaining that most restrictions on DTCA would violate the First 
Amendment). 
 115. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255–57, 1263 (N.J. 1999). 
For my scathing critique of Perez, see Noah, supra note 103, at 897–905. 
 116. See, e.g., Watts v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 365 P.3d 944, 950–51 (Ariz. 
2016) (declining to recognize the DTCA exception, “which has been adopted only 
in New Jersey”). 
 117. See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 908–
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from these outliers, the rule continues to represent a 
durable feature of failure-to-warn litigation involving 
therapeutic products that remain accessible only through 
health care professionals.118 
2. Crafting an Exception to Cover Conflicted Physicians 
When manufacturers of prescription products reward 
physicians for patronizing their wares, at least some of the 
rationales thought to justify the limited duty to warn break 
down. In contrast to the exceptions referenced in the 
Products Liability Restatement, however, this suggestion 
has only recently and almost imperceptibly surfaced.119 In 
 
10 (W. Va. 2007); see also Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 
1214–24 (D.N.M. 2008) (predicting that the New Mexico courts would reject the 
doctrine). See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., Marketing Pharmaceutical 
Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued Viability of 
Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 355–69, 386–87 (2009); Kyle T. Fogt, Note, The 
Road Less Traveled: West Virginia’s Rejection of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 34 J. CORP. L. 587 (2009). 
In 2016, the state legislature announced its “intention . . . to adopt and allow 
the development of a learned intermediary doctrine as a defense in cases based 
upon claims of inadequate warning or instruction for prescription drugs or 
medical devices,” W. VA. CODE § 55-7-30(b) (West 2018), which abrogated at 
least the broader holding in Karl for future cases, see J.C. ex rel. Michelle C. v. 
Pfizer, Inc., 814 S.E.2d 234, 238 n.9 (W. Va. 2018). 
 118. See In re Zimmer, NexGen Knee Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 884 F.3d 
746, 752 (7th Cir. 2018) (concluding that “there is good reason to think that 
given the opportunity, the Wisconsin Supreme Court would join the vast 
majority of state supreme courts and adopt the learned-intermediary doctrine”); 
Diane S. Kane, Annotation, Construction and Application of Learned-
Intermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5th 1, § 2.5 (1998 & 2018 Supp.) (collecting 
almost one hundred decisions from just the last decade); cf. Lars Noah, Treat 
Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails American Health 
Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 378–83 (2006) (discussing the liability 
questions that arise after powerful drugs switch to nonprescription status). 
 119. See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 799 (4th ed. 2017) (“What, however, if a prescriber receives industry 
funding—should that provide a new basis for recognizing an exception?”). One 
year after publication of the Products Liability Restatement, a federal appellate 
court largely dismissed the idea in a case involving a spinal fixation device in 
spite of the fact that the surgeon received substantial sums as a consultant to 
the manufacturer—including 25,000 shares of company stock and $250,000 
annually—as his work related to a device unrelated to the plaintiff’s treatment. 
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light of the previously discussed scope and consequences of 
industry payments to health care professionals, coupled 
with the general failure of other institutions to tackle the 
resulting potential conflicts of interest, judges should 
seriously consider recognizing a novel exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine in these circumstances. 
In 2012, a pair of federal district courts squarely 
confronted this question but arrived at conflicting results.120 
Both cases considered failure-to-warn claims involving the 
anti-inflammatory biologic Humira® (adalimumab), which 
treats various autoimmune conditions such as rheumatoid 
arthritis and psoriasis,121 and both judges had to guess 
whether the highest courts in their respective states would 
craft an exception when pharmaceutical manufacturers had 
compensated prescribers, though they did so in tandem 
with efforts by the plaintiffs to urge adoption of a DTCA 
exception. The payments in these cases came from the 
postapproval “Humira Efficacy Response Optimization” 
(HERO) study, which the plaintiffs had portrayed as 
amounting to little more than a seeding trial.122 
 
See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 157, 163–64 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the “learned intermediary doctrine 
should not apply because Dr. Mathews was not independent of [the 
manufacturer] in view of his financial connection with Danek as a consultant”). 
 120. Compare Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 971–73 (S.D. Tex. 
2012) (allowing for the possibility of recognizing such an exception), with 
DiBartolo v. Abbott Labs., 914 F. Supp. 2d 601, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (declining 
to do so). A decade earlier, another federal district court considered this issue, 
though only insofar as it might have impacted proof of causation. See Miller v. 
Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1129 n.108 (D. Kan. 2002) (noting that the 
prescribing physician’s consulting relationship with the defendant would not 
provide the jury with a sufficient basis for disbelieving his testimony that he 
already knew of the risk and would have selected the drug even with a fuller 
warning), aff’d on other grounds, 356 F.3d 1326, 1335–36 (10th Cir. 2004); see 
also In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-MD-01928, 2011 WL 2117257, at 
*4–5 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2011) (same). 
 121. See Danny Hakim, The Humira Play: Raise High Prices, Steadily, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2018, at BU4 (“Humira is the best-selling prescription drug in 
the world.”). 
 122. See Brief of Petitioners at 18–20, Jones v. Abbott Labs., No. M2013-
00769-SC-R23-CQ (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2013) (on file with author); id. at 34 
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In Murthy v. Abbott Laboratories,123 a federal district 
court in Texas endorsed the idea of an exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine when prescribers receive 
drug industry compensation. Referencing some of the 
research and commentary available at that time,124 the 
court explained that such payments undercut assumptions 
supporting the rule.125 The federal judge in Murthy plainly 
felt emboldened to take this step by a then-recent opinion of 
the state’s intermediate appellate court favoring the DTCA 
exception,126 but the Texas Supreme Court soon thereafter 
reversed, reiterating its adherence to the learned 
intermediary rule at least given the facts of that case.127 
Although Judge Ellison’s analysis of the issue hardly 
depended on the state appellate court’s earlier decision, the 
intervening signal from the state’s high court suggests that 
Murthy offers little precedential value for those advocating 
 
(referring to the “payment by Abbott of patient ‘bounties’ to prescribing 
physicians”). 
 123. 847 F. Supp. 2d 958. 
 124. See id. at 972–73 nn.5–6. 
 125. See id. at 971 (“[W]hen a physician is compensated by a drug company, 
some of the assumptions underlying the learned intermediary doctrine no 
longer hold.”); id. at 973 (“[W]hen a physician receives compensation or gifts 
from drug companies, his or her role as the neutral decision-maker may be 
diminished.”). 
 126. See id. at 971 (citing Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 310 S.W.3d 476, 499 
(Tex. App. 2010)). Separately, however, the court dismissed most of the 
complaint because of a statutory presumption of adequacy for FDA-approved 
warnings. See id. at 973–77. Upon further consideration and review of 
additional evidence, the court vacated this part of its order and allowed the 
plaintiff to file an amended complaint. See Murthy v. Abbott Labs., No. 4:11-cv-
105, 2012 WL 6020157 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2012). 
 127. See Centocor, Inc. v. Hamilton, 372 S.W.3d 140, 162–64 (Tex. 2012) 
(declining to decide, however, “whether Texas law should recognize a DTC 
advertising exception when a prescription drug manufacturer distributes 
intentionally misleading information directly to patients or prospective 
patients” or “any of the other exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine”); 
see also id. at 162 n.22 (calling out Murthy for its erroneous prediction about 
Texas law). 
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an exception whenever drug companies pay prescribers.128 
Just nine months after Murthy, in DiBartolo v. Abbott 
Laboratories,129 a federal district court in New York 
declined to recognize an exception to the learned 
intermediary rule for physician payments. Judge Buchwald 
simply pointed to the lack of any local precedent, adding 
that the “plaintiff has not demonstrated that Murthy is part 
of any trend supporting an exception.”130 In an 
accompanying footnote, the judge elaborated somewhat 
confusingly about why she remained unpersuaded on the 
merits: 
Looking more broadly to [the doctrine’s] rationale, plaintiff has not 
demonstrated that an exception . . . would be justified even if one 
assumes that physicians compensated by Abbott would be more 
likely to prescribe Humira than to prescribe a competitor drug. 
Such physicians would not be absolved of their duty to prescribe 
drugs to patients only when medically appropriate. It is not clear, 
moreover, that manufacturer-compensated physicians would in 
fact neglect their professional duties to an extent that would 
undermine [the learned intermediary doctrine].131 
 
 128. Nonetheless, one federal court subsequently relied on Murthy in 
declining to apply the learned intermediary rule to dismiss a failure-to-warn 
claim asserted by a subject allegedly injured while participating in a clinical 
trial of an investigational hepatitis C drug. See Rodriguez v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 
No. 2:14-CV-324, 2015 WL 236621, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2015) (explaining 
that the plaintiff had pled that his personal physician and investigator “was not 
acting within a physician-patient relationship during the clinical study but was 
rather an extension of Gilead, incentivized to act as a drug marketer rather 
than as a treating physician”). 
 129. 914 F. Supp. 2d 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 130. Id. at 616 (adding that the learned intermediary “doctrine [is] firmly 
established in New York law”). 
 131. Id. at 616 n.6. This passage made an assumption but then questioned 
the assumed premise, mixed unresolved questions of facts peculiar to the case 
before the court and broader (“legislative”) factual disputes about the potential 
influence of industry payments (ignoring the page long footnote in Murthy that 
discussed some of the relevant research), and implausibly suggested that a 
physician’s decision to prescribe a medically inappropriate drug would be so 
wildly unforeseeable to the company that paid him or her as to represent a 
superseding cause (as opposed to giving the plaintiff a parallel malpractice 
claim). 
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Separately, in responding to Abbott’s motion to dismiss, the 
plaintiff conceded that she had not yet discovered whether 
her physician had received any payments from the 
manufacturer of Humira.132 DiBartolo, therefore, hardly 
represents a carefully reasoned rejection of the payment 
exception, though a couple of months later it helped to 
persuade a federal judge in Massachusetts not to follow 
Murthy’s lead in still another Humira case.133 Otherwise, 
however, the issue has attracted essentially no further 
attention.134 
 
 132. See id. at 616 (“[P]laintiff’s allegations that Abbott compensated Dr. Cui 
are completely speculative, based entirely on what Abbott allegedly did in other 
cases involving other physicians.”). I have found only one commentator who 
previously has addressed this question. See Kate Greenwood, Physician 
Conflicts of Interest in Court: Beyond the “Independent Physician” Litigation 
Heuristic, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 789–94, 815–19 (2014). Although she 
usefully pointed out that the published opinion in Murthy represented a 
watered-down approach to the learned intermediary issue when compared with 
the court’s original (superseded) opinion, she then dismissed even that 
discussion as dicta, see id. at 763–65, failing to realize that the court later 
revisited its decision to dismiss on other grounds, see supra note 126. Ms. 
Greenwood entirely ignored the contemporaneous decision DiBartolo and never 
mentioned seeding trials by name. 
 133. See Calisi v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-10671-DJC, 2013 WL 5462274, at *3 
(D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013); see also Calisi v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-10671-DJC, 
2013 WL 5441355, at *17 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 2013) (treating as irrelevant, 
though with no additional discussion, the alleged “financial incentives that 
Abbott provided to Dr. Pastan”); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 04-MD-
1596, 06-CV-3457, 2010 WL 348276, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2010) (rejecting a 
similar earlier effort under Illinois law). 
 134. Five years ago, the Houston-based plaintiffs’ attorney involved in both of 
the federal Humira lawsuits contacted me about this issue, attaching the briefs 
of the parties in a case then pending before the Tennessee Supreme Court. See 
E-mail from Andy Vickery to author (June 5, 2013, 18:51 E.D.T.) (on file with 
author). As explained in my reply to him, “I was intrigued by your suggested LI 
exception in cases of co. payments to Drs. and will be curious to see how it all 
turns out.” E-mail from author to Andy Vickery (June 6, 2013, 07:19 E.D.T.) (on 
file with author). In further response, he added that “we have unbelievable 
record to change law in that arena in numerous Humira cases. Just tried case 
to verdict in Chicago. Jury cringed, visibly, when depo of prescribing doctor was 
played and she testified (a) was ok to take Abbott money, and (b) ok not to tell 
patient about it.” E-mail from Andy Vickery to author (June 6, 2013, 08:42 
E.D.T.) (on file with author). This use of such evidence at trial struck me, 
however, as more about atmosphere than doctrinal change, and it also 
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Although the learned intermediary doctrine is often 
framed in terms of the greater relative expertise of health 
care professionals, courts also assume that these 
professionals will exercise their judgment independently.135 
When that assumption no longer holds true by virtue of the 
actions of therapeutic product manufacturers, then the 
latter parties arguably should owe heightened duties to 
communicate with patients.136 Alternatively, plaintiffs 
could argue that overpromotion by the seller had 
undermined an otherwise adequate warning directed to 
their physicians.137 In the context of promotion by 
remuneration as opposed to misinformation, however, 
prescribers will have a greater inclination to deny that gifts 
or grants in any way polluted their judgment. Removing the 
learned intermediary doctrine in the event of payments to 
prescribers offers a more straightforward approach. 
 
represented the last that I have heard to even hint at any successful efforts at 
using such an exception. 
 135. See Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharm., 526 F.3d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 2008); Eck 
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2001) (emphasizing the 
assumption that the prescriber “exercise[d] independent judgment”); Marcus v. 
Specific Pharm., 77 N.Y.S.2d 508, 509–10 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (“There is no reason to 
believe that a physician would . . . substitute for his own judgment that of a 
drug manufacturer.”). 
 136. Cf. Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned 
Intermediary: The Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 670–76, 689–94 (2007) (proposing a different exception 
on similar grounds). 
 137. See, e.g., Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 F. App’x 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010); 
Brown v. Glaxo, Inc., 790 So. 2d 35, 40–41 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Holley v. 
Burroughs Wellcome Co., 348 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. 1986); see also Hyman & 
Armstrong, P.S.C. v. Gunderson, 279 S.W.3d 93, 111–12, 121–22 (Ky. 2008); cf. 
Patteson v. AstraZeneca, LP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 35–37 (D.D.C. 2012), app. 
dismissed, 2014 WL 3013767 (D.C. Cir. 2014); id. at 36 (“Repeated visits by 
sales representatives to a physician regarding a pharmaceutical drug alone, 
however, do not constitute overpromotion—there must be a link between these 
visits and misinformation that would make the prior warnings ineffective.”); In 
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 18, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In 
unusual cases, courts have found that a drug manufacturer’s excessive 
promotion of its product may negate or call into question operation of the 
learned intermediary doctrine.”), aff’d sub nom. Head v. Eli Lilly & Co., 394 F. 
App’x 819, 821 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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If courts adopted this exception, then they also would 
have to resolve various practical issues.138 Mere inclusion in 
the federal disclosure database would not suffice for several 
reasons: (1) it suffers from inaccuracies,139 (2) it includes 
providers who have received fairly small gifts and 
payments,140 and (3) it covers a wide range of corporate 
donors. Plaintiffs would have to undertake discovery to 
confirm suspicions based on the federal database or some 
other source; courts may want to define a threshold amount 
before they would consider the medical judgments of 
 
 138. See Greenwood, supra note 132, at 817 (“The factual questions raised 
when a plaintiff plausibly pleads that his or her doctor had a financial 
relationship with the defendant manufacturer are many.”); id. at 822 (“In 
personal injury cases where there is a financial relationship between a 
physician and the defendant manufacturer, the question of the physician’s 
independence would become one of fact, to be determined in light of factors such 
as the nature, size, and scope of the relationship.”). 
 139. See Neil M. Kirschner et al., Health Policy Basics: The Physician 
Payment Sunshine Act and the Open Payments Program, 161 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 519, 520 (2014) (discussing opportunities to dispute information before the 
CMS); Loftus & Walker, supra note 40, at B3 (reporting that a sizeable fraction 
of recipients lodged disputes for the first full year of reports, but that the AMA 
nonetheless complained about the failure to otherwise validate the data); 
Schencker & Richards, supra note 43, at C1 (The AMA “has long criticized the 
accuracy of the data.”). 
 140. Federal law uses a $10 (or $100 aggregate annual) threshold, see supra 
note 39 and accompanying text, while some states opted for thresholds of $25 or 
$50, see Susan Chimonas et al., Show Us the Money: Lessons in Transparency 
from State Pharmaceutical Marketing Disclosure Laws, 45 HEALTH SERV. RES. 
98, 102 (2010). In addition, the likely impact of a payment might vary 
depending on what percentage of a particular provider’s income it would 
represent; for highly paid specialists, getting $500 from a company would 
amount to petty cash, while an overextended general practitioner in a rural 
area might genuinely appreciate such generosity. Cf. Bimal H. Ashar et al., 
Prevalence and Determinants of Physician Participation in Conducting 
Pharmaceutical-Sponsored Clinical Trials and Lectures, 19 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 1140, 1144 (2004) (“Our study suggests that dissatisfaction with income 
partially explains participation in these activities.”). Lastly, even modest 
individual payments may cumulate and become more consequential when 
viewed in the aggregate. See Loftus, supra note 41, at A1 (“Consulting and 
speaking fees are an important source of income for some physicians, who can 
be paid tens of thousands of dollars a year for such services.”). See generally 
Thompson, supra note 44, at 574. 
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physicians potentially corrupted;141 and even sizeable 
payments would have to get linked to choices about 
prescribing or use that allegedly resulted in an injury to a 
particular patient.142 Seeding trials might simplify the task 
of satisfying such evidentiary burdens,143 while more 
general consulting agreements with the parent company of 
a subsidiary producing therapeutic products selected by a 
health care professional suggest that such inquires could 
become rather complicated.144 
 
 141. See Murthy v. Abbott Labs., 847 F. Supp. 2d 958, 973 (S.D. Tex. 2012) 
(“[T]he Court would have to examine the factual circumstances surrounding the 
compensation of Murthy’s physician in order to evaluate whether application of 
the learned intermediary doctrine is appropriate.”). The industry codes, though 
voluntary, might help in this task. Cf. Robinson v. G.G.C., Inc., 808 P.2d 522, 
526–27 (Nev. 1991) (upholding the admissibility of an ANSI standard adopted 
after an accident). Although they use the term “modest” and a rough threshold 
of $100 per gift, and do so for purposes of a prohibition, see supra notes 9, 19–
20, and accompanying text, courts could decide that aggregate annual payments 
to a physician exceeding such thresholds would deprive donors of the learned 
intermediary doctrine’s protections. 
 142. Cf. Koenig v. Purdue Pharma Co., 435 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (N.D. Tex. 
2006) (granting defendant summary judgment because the plaintiff had no 
evidence linking the company’s sales calls to decisions by his physicians to 
prescribe OxyContin® (oxycodone)). See generally supra note 5 (explaining the 
heightened risks associated with new drugs when initially launched). 
 143. See Eichenwald & Kolata, supra note 13, at 1 (“Doctors with money at 
stake may persuade patients to take drugs that are inappropriate or even 
unsafe.”); see also Krumholz et al., supra note 66, at 1105 (pointing out that, 
during the seeding trial of Neurontin, which had enrolled 2759 subjects, “11 
patients died, 73 experienced serious adverse events, and 997 experienced less 
serious adverse effects”). Conversely, in seeding trials and similar studies, 
sponsors typically would supply consent forms with detailed risk disclosures 
and an expectation that physician-investigators get signatures from their 
enrolled patient-subjects. See, e.g., Murthy, 847 F. Supp. 2d at 964. In those 
circumstances, an exception to the learned intermediary rule would have little 
impact on sellers. 
 144. Cf. Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 164 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(pointing out that “Dr. Mathews’ consulting relationship with Danek involved 
devices other than internal fixation devices” used on the plaintiff). Indeed, 
product sellers might simply respond by funneling more of their grants to 
doctors through seemingly independent third-party organizations such as 
patient advocacy groups. See Noah, supra note 96, at 290–94; Thomas Ginsberg, 
Donations Tie Drug Firms and Nonprofits, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 28, 2006, at 
A1 (“[M]any patient groups and drug companies maintain close, multimillion-
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Critics of the DTCA exception worried that it might 
prompt a counterproductive response. If faced with the 
threat of expanded tort liability, prescription drug 
manufacturers would not supply warnings to patients; 
instead, they would cease engaging in such promotional 
campaigns, thereby depriving patients of potentially useful, 
even if incomplete, information.145 Proponents of the DTCA 
exception might not have minded such a response,146 so it 
depends on whether one sees anything of value in pitching 
prescription products to patients. This question seems less 
 
dollar relationships while disclosing limited or no details about the ties. . . . For 
drug companies, patient groups carry credibility that the industry sometimes 
lacks to target patients and ‘opinion leaders’ who drive prescriptions, and 
hence, sales.”); Charles Ornstein & Tracy Weber, Ties Between Drugmakers, 
Advocacy Groups Probed, WASH. POST, May 9, 2012, at A2 (focusing on the 
American Pain Foundation); see also Emily Kopp et al., Drug Companies Paid 
$116 Million to Patient Advocacy Groups in 2015 Alone, New Data Suggests, 
PBS NEWS HOUR (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/drug-
companies-pay-116-million-to-patient-advocacy-groups-in-2015-alone-new-data-
suggests. As a team of CMS officials wrote, “transfers of value can occur 
indirectly—through specialty societies, for example—when funding originates 
with manufacturers.” Shantanu Agrawal et al., The Sunshine Act—Effects on 
Physicians, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2054, 2056 (2013). 
 145. See Noah, supra note 12, at 177–78; id. at 144 (“[F]aced with the 
prospect of significantly enhanced tort liability, pharmaceutical manufacturers 
may choose to discontinue most promotions directed to persons other than 
medical professionals.”); id. at 169 (“[R]ecognition of an exception in such cases 
might be counterproductive insofar as manufacturers react to the expanded 
duty to warn by conveying far less rather than more information to patients.”); 
id. at 178 (“Direct advertising encourages active participation by consumers in 
prescribing decisions, a favorable development that courts should not ‘reward’ 
by expanding the tort duties of drug manufacturers and, thereby, discouraging 
such advertising in the future.”); see also id. at 179 (“[C]ritics of the learned 
intermediary rule often emphasize the value of communicating additional 
information to consumers and then simply assume that expanding the duty to 
warn will best promote this goal. Eliminating the doctrine altogether would do 
so, but carving out only an advertising exception may do nothing to improve 
communication with consumers.”). 
 146. See id. at 170 (“[P]roponents of an advertising exception seem to rest 
their position on what they perceive as crass, profit-motivated advertising of 
prescription drugs. Once pharmaceutical manufacturers stoop to direct 
consumer advertising, the argument goes, they no longer deserve the special 
treatment that they have enjoyed under tort law.”); cf. id. at 177 n.135 (“Even 
critics concede that direct advertising provides significant valuable information 
to consumers.”). 
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contestable here: if faced with an exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine, manufacturers would probably not 
start supplying warnings to patients; instead, they would 
stop lavishing gifts and money on physicians.147 Unlike 
other forms of industry advertising directed toward health 
care professionals, rewarding those who select a company’s 
therapeutic products lacks any communicative value.148 
Some physicians might complain about the loss of these 
bonuses and mementos of appreciation,149 but in no sense 
would patients find themselves worse off. Insofar as this 
 
 147. If, instead, manufacturers did supply risk information directly to 
patients, then another rationale favoring the learned intermediary rule would 
come into play—namely, concerns about intruding upon the doctor-patient 
relationship. See id. at 157 (“[W]arnings that contradict information supplied by 
the physician will undermine the patient’s trust in the physician’s judgment.”). 
Again, however, in cases where a prescriber has a conflict of interest, rattling a 
patient’s naive confidence in the judgment of their physician might represent 
“just what the doctor ordered.” 
 148. See Lars Noah, Permission to Speak Freely?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 
248, 250–54 (2014) (discussing the constitutional protections that apply when 
companies seek to communicate potentially valuable therapeutic information to 
physicians); see also Noah, supra note 114, at 68–84 (elaborating). Although 
efforts to discourage companies from handing out money in exchange for 
prescribing would not seem to raise any First Amendment issues, trying to 
punish companies for bankrolling others to communicate (or collect) information 
might do so. See id. at 84–85 n.217. Nonetheless, companies argue that gifts 
represent an essential part of their communicative encounter, providing a 
means for their agents to “get a foot in the door” of busy physicians, and that 
otherwise they could not effectively deliver their constitutionally protected 
messages. See Gardiner Harris, Minnesota Limit on Gifts to Doctors May Catch 
on, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2007, at A25 (reporting such arguments in response to 
one state’s move to ban free meals for physicians); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 
564 U.S. 552, 578–79 (2011) (“Vermont may be displeased that detailers who 
use prescriber-identifying information are effective in promoting brand-name 
drugs. . . . The State may not burden the speech of others in order to tilt public 
debate in a preferred direction.”); IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 490 F. Supp. 2d 
163, 173 (D.N.H. 2007) (quoting an anecdote about a sales rep regularly 
delivering coffee to a clinic and then complaining to a nurse that this had failed 
to increase their use of her company’s drug), rev’d, 550 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 149. See Chimonas et al., supra note 72, at 186 (“Regulatory efforts irritated 
the physicians [participating in focus groups]. They resented limitations on 
entertainment and other personal-use gifts . . . . They particularly objected to 
excluding spouses from industry-sponsored events.”); see also supra note 3 
(explaining that some doctors miss getting gifts from patients). 
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exception would have the effect of discouraging companies 
from giving sizeable gifts to persons responsible for 
selecting therapeutic products, so much the better. 
Furthermore, if companies want to continue engaging 
in generous outreach efforts to the medical community, 
then they would have a ready means of fulfilling their 
expanded duty to warn. Unlike the proposed DTCA 
exception, which—contrary to the misconceptions of some 
courts and commentators—could not get satisfied simply by 
communicating fuller risk information through that 
medium,150 manufacturers have the power to contractually 
obligate recipients of their largesse to disseminate warnings 
to patients under the care of those (and only those) health 
care professionals.151 In the event of a physician’s neglect in 
doing so, the manufacturer could seek indemnification if 
later held liable for failing to warn a patient directly. Thus, 
another common objection lodged against suggested 
exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine has no 
particular force in this setting. 
Product sellers may face vicarious liability for the 
tortious conduct of their employees.152 These issues have 
 
 150. See Noah, supra note 12, at 174 (“Once the duty to warn expands, risk 
information contained in the advertisements would not satisfy a drug 
manufacturer’s duty to warn patients directly.”); Noah, supra note 103, at 901–
03; id. at 900 (“What the plaintiffs wanted, however, was not clearer risk 
information in advertisements that they may not have seen (or remembered); 
instead, they sought printed warnings to accompany the drugs when later 
dispensed to them.”). 
 151. Cf. Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 1365–69 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(holding that a vaccine manufacturer had satisfied its duty to warn by 
delegating to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention the 
responsibility for disseminating patient labeling). But cf. In re Vioxx Cases, No. 
JCCP 4247, 2006 WL 6305292, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2006) (rejecting 
the argument that the learned intermediary doctrine did not apply to a 
prescriber previously paid by Merck to serve as an investigator and speaker, 
adding that “if such payments alone sufficed, a manufacturer would have to 
obtain the patient list of every physician it pays for research in order to 
somehow provide direct warnings”). 
 152. See, e.g., Delfino v. Griffo, 257 P.3d 917, 928–29 (N.M. 2011) (allowing 
vicarious liability claims to proceed against the employers of pharmaceutical 
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become more important as industry salespersons 
occasionally insinuate themselves in patient care.153 When 
drug and device manufacturers hire practicing physicians 
to serve as consultants, speakers, or investigators, one can 
make the argument that these doctors have become agents 
of the manufacturer.154 Nonetheless, because the physicians 
 
sales representatives who purchased drinks for a doctor’s office staff, one of 
whom later caused a fatal accident); cf. Catlett v. Wyeth, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 
1374, 1381–83 (M.D. Ga. 2004) (holding that sales agent would not face 
personal liability for failing to warn physicians of prescription drug risks). 
 153. See, e.g., Sanchez-Scott v. Alza Pharm., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410, 418–19 
(Ct. App. 2001) (allowing an invasion of privacy claim against a drug 
manufacturer where a breast cancer patient had not consented to the presence 
of one of its salesmen during an exam as part of a preceptorship); Hurley v. 
Heart Physicians, P.C., 898 A.2d 777, 787–88 (Conn. 2006) (allowing a claim 
against the manufacturer where one of its salesmen allegedly had adjusted the 
settings of an implanted pacemaker in an improper manner); see also 
Christiana C. Jacxsens et al., Beyond the Basics: Expanding Theories of 
Liability and Defenses for Claims Involving Medical Device Sales 
Representatives, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1087, 1112–16, 1143–50 (2013); 
Abigail Zuger, Fever Pitch: Getting Doctors to Prescribe Is Big Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 11, 1999, at A1 (“[T]hey begin to blend into the health care team. 
Salesmen who sell surgical devices have long been present at operations to 
guide doctors using new equipment . . . .”); id. (Harrisburg Hospital’s “Dr. 
Shaughnessy said he once found residents actually presenting cases to a 
pharmaceutical representative for treatment advice, apparently finding him 
more pleasant and accessible than their supervising physicians.”). 
 154. See Margolis, supra note 71, at 1236 (worrying about “the loss of 
autonomy as physicians become the agents of pharmaceutical manufacturers”); 
id. at 1237 (arguing that seeding trials pose such concerns even more clearly); 
Daniel Carlat, Dr. Drug Rep, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 25, 2007, at 64 (recounting 
that the author, a practicing psychiatrist, had earned almost $30,000 in extra 
income one year on the speakers circuit pitching Wyeth’s antidepressant 
Effexor® (venlafaxine)). Thus, when a company enlists independent physicians 
to communicate information that it could not share, the government has on rare 
occasions brought conspiracy charges against the health care professional. See 
Alex Berenson, Indictment of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 22, 2006, at A1 (reporting the arrest of a psychiatrist accused of conspiring 
with the manufacturer of Xyrem® (gamma hydroxybutyrate) to publicize off-
label uses of this narcolepsy drug at continuing medical education events); 
Weber & Ornstein, supra note 37, at G1 (noting that this physician pled guilty 
to a misdemeanor count of drug misbranding and got sentenced to a year of 
probation before committing suicide); cf. United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 
149, 156–58, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (dismissing prosecution of the sales rep 
involved in that case on First Amendment grounds). In some cases, the 
arrangements become almost incestuous. See Thomas, supra note 36, at A1 (“In 
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technically would qualify as independent contractors rather 
than regular employees,155 manufacturers normally would 
not have to fear vicarious liability.156 In particular, courts 
have rejected efforts to hold pharmaceutical companies that 
sponsor clinical trials vicariously liable for the actions of 
principal investigators.157 
 
addition to paying high-prescribing doctors to speak on behalf of Subsys, Insys 
also hired the doctors’ family members.”); id. (“[I]n at least two cases, the 
company hired the adult children of top doctors to serve as their parents’ sales 
representatives.”); cf. Weber & Ornstein, supra note 37, at G1 (repeating 
allegations that a frequent prescriber of the antipsychotic Zyprexa® (olanzapine) 
felt underappreciated by the payments he had received from the manufacturer 
for speaking engagements and switched his loyalties after Eli Lilly refused to 
hire his son as a sales rep). 
 155. See Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 163–64 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(“[I]f Dr. Mathews were [not merely a consultant but] an employee of Danek or 
so closely related to Danek that he could not exercise independent professional 
judgment, a question could legitimately be raised as to whether he was an 
intermediary. The resolution of that complex question would depend on the 
nature of the relationship between the manufacturer and the physician . . . .”); 
cf. Lenahan v. Univ. of Chi., 808 N.E.2d 1078, 1083–84 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) 
(departing from the general rule that hospitals have no independent duty to 
secure patient consent in a case involving medical research). 
 156. See, e.g., Tracy v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 569 N.E.2d 875, 879 (Ohio 
1991) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a physician became the agent of a 
drug manufacturer for accepting $15 to enroll patients in a trial of a 
prescription smoking-cessation product so as to make the learned intermediary 
doctrine inapplicable). See generally Pusey v. Bator, 762 N.E.2d 968, 972 (Ohio 
2002) (explaining that “an employer is generally not liable for the negligent acts 
of an independent contractor”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1965). 
 157. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 548–50 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Suthers v. Amgen Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 416, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kernke v. 
Menninger Clinic, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121–22, 1124 (D. Kan. 2001) 
(applying the learned intermediary doctrine in granting summary judgment to 
the manufacturer of an investigational drug for schizophrenia, adding that the 
other named defendants owed duties to the subject); see also Vinion v. Amgen 
Inc., 272 F. App’x 582, 584 (9th Cir. 2008) (agreeing that the consent documents 
made no promise of continued access to the study drug at the conclusion of the 
clinical trial and that the investigator was not the manufacturer’s apparent 
agent); cf. id. at 585–87 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a reasonable 
jury could regard the investigator as an implied agent of the manufacturer 
sufficient to commit the companies to supply Enbrel® (etanercept) free of 
charge). But cf. Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713, 718–19 & n.6 (N.D. Ill. 
1978) (allowing battery claims to proceed against a manufacturer of 
diethylstilbesterol for sponsoring a clinical trial at a teaching hospital that 
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Even without the prospect of vicarious liability, 
physicians paid to market prescription drugs and devices 
might find themselves treated as members of the chain of 
distribution. Although health care professionals need not 
fear strict liability for defective products that they use or 
recommend,158 they might open themselves to such claims if 
viewed instead as conduits for the sale of drugs and 
devices.159 The more forgiving standards used for judging 
claims of professional negligence would give way to the 
more demanding standards of products liability; moreover, 
physicians on the (intermittent) payroll of sellers might face 
the prospect of liability for any defects introduced upstream 
of them (typically at the level of the finished good 
manufacturer) even if they had no way of knowing that 
such flaws existed in the products.160 The ultimate financial 
responsibility would flow back to those manufacturers—at 
least barring bankruptcy—by the operation of express or 
implied rights of indemnification,161 but, depending on the 
language of their contracts with such consultants,162 they 
 
administered the drug to hundreds of its patients without their knowledge), 
aff’d mem. after further proceedings, 727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1984); Darke v. 
Estate of Isner, No. 022194E, 2005 WL 3729113, at *14 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 
15, 2005) (holding that evidence of a financial relationship with the principal 
investigator might suffice to make gene therapy trial sponsor vicariously liable). 
 158. See Noah, supra note 103, at 918–19; see also id. at 923–24 (explaining 
that hospitals enjoy a similar exemption). 
 159. Cf. Jacxsens et al., supra note 153, at 1136–40 (explaining that 
salespersons employed by a company might get recharacterized as downstream 
sellers subject to strict liability). 
 160. See Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (D. Nev. 1993) 
(rejecting a pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on a strict liability claim 
for an alleged failure to transmit the manufacturer’s warning to a consumer 
about a prescription drug’s risks); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. 
LIAB. § 6(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (limiting downstream liability for prescription 
products to manufacturing defects); Noah, supra note 103, at 917–22 
(discussing ambiguities in this provision). 
 161. See Godoy v. Abamaster of Miami, Inc., 754 N.Y.S.2d 301, 306–07 (App. 
Div. 2003). 
 162. Cf. Michael D. Tomatz, Note, Prozac: Is It the Next Rising Giant in 
Products Liability?, 12 REV. LITIG. 705, 711 & n.41, 713–14 (1993) (noting Eli 
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also may now face what amounts to vicarious liability for 
the failures (negligent or innocent) by health care 
professionals to pass along adequate warnings in a way 
that the learned intermediary rule would have barred and 
made solely a matter of potential malpractice liability.163 If 
this convoluted scenario represents a plausible account of 
how responsibility for failures to warn patients ultimately 
might get charged to therapeutic product manufacturers, 
then why not accomplish the same result more forthrightly 
by recognizing an exception to the learned intermediary 
doctrine in cases of physician payments? 
III. CONCLUSION 
The pharmaceutical and medical device industries 
aggressively market their wares to health care 
professionals, and gift giving has become a fixed feature of 
this process. Most observers regard offers of financial 
incentives to select therapeutic products as crossing the 
line, but the practice has continued in different guises. 
Various institutions have taken fairly tepid stabs at 
combating inappropriate gifts and payments to physicians: 
more than a quarter century of voluntary industry 
guidelines and ethical codes for medical professionals, 
fifteen years of nonbinding federal guidelines, or the still 
newer state and then federal reporting laws. Self-
regulation, threats of prosecution, and transparency 
initiatives may have curbed the most egregious abuses, but 
manufacturers always have found clever new ways of 
 
Lilly’s promise to indemnify physicians sued for prescribing the antidepressant 
Prozac® (fluoxetine)). 
 163. See, e.g., Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 
1989) (affirming summary judgment for a drug manufacturer on failure-to-warn 
claim notwithstanding prescriber’s alleged failure to share that information 
with his patient); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1043 (Kan. 1990) (granting 
summary judgment to the manufacturer of an IUD where the physician had 
neglected to hand out its patient labeling in favor of a homemade leaflet); 
Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119–22 (N.J. 1989) (absolving drug 
manufacturer but remanding claim that physician failed to warn patient). 
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purchasing the loyalty of prescribers. 
As presently configured, tort law has essentially 
nothing to say about industry payments to physicians. 
Fairly minor modifications to doctrine could, however, make 
a big difference. Courts could include potential conflicts of 
interest as material information that physicians must 
reveal when securing consent from their patients, but such 
professional negligence claims would offer a difficult 
mechanism for effectuating such disclosures and, therefore, 
probably not do much to discourage gift taking. Instead, 
courts could expand the duties of manufacturers. By 
depriving therapeutic product sellers of the learned 
intermediary doctrine when they provide financial 
incentives to those intermediaries, manufacturers of 
prescription drugs and medical devices would face enhanced 
exposure to inadequate warning claims. The prospect of 
having to communicate risk information directly to patients 
might make companies think twice before lavishing gifts 
and payments on physicians, which in turn would help to 
ensure that those learned intermediaries continue to serve 
the best interests of their patients. 
 
